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Preface 
 
The School of Public Administration is the only coherent multi-
disciplinary education in Sweden and we annually exam about 50 
Master Degrees. In general, our students produce high quality mas-
ter thesis, and some of them are even excellent.  
Maja Rhodin Edlund’s thesis is an example of the latter. Her 
thesis is written within one of our prioritized themes: gender equali-
ty. She examines the composition of, and assignments to, the stand-
ing committees of the European Parliament (EP) in all direct elected 
EPs, covering the years 1979 to 2009, in order to test feminist theories 
concerning the impact of sex on the assignment of individual com-
mittee members. A quite extensive data set is systematically ana-
lyzed by using the statistical tools of cross tabulation and logistic 
regression.   
It is shown that women are overrepresented in EP committees 
concerned with social welfare policies, but underrepresented in EP 
committees concerned with the basic functions of the EU policies, 
and economic and technic policies; and that sex has an impact on 
assignments to EP committees concerned with social welfare policies 
and the basic functions of the EU policies. The findings suggest that 
feminist theory can bring important insight into the study of wom-
en’s representation in the EP. Although the theory needs to be re-
vised and further developed at the supranational, hence, the findings 
thus encourage further research on the matter. 
 
Stig Montin 
Professor, School of Public Administration  
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1 Introduction 
The European Parliament (EP) has undergone a rapid transformation 
since the late 1970s. Having begun life as a consultative assembly, its 
involvements in legislation, budgetary politics and oversight within 
the European Union (EU) has grown rapidly since the first direct 
elections in 1979 and the Single European Act (SEA) in July 1987 
(Whitaker 2011:1). Subsequently, the power of the EP has grown 
with each treaty, most recently the Treaty of Lisbon in December 
2009, which placed the EP, in most policy domains, on an equal foot-
ing with the Council of Ministers under the co-decision procedure. 
Today, the EP is, arguably, more powerful than most of its national 
counterparts (Yordanova 2011:597; Yoshinaka et al. 2010:457). Being 
the only direct elected institution of the EU, it owes its empower-
ment to the hopes of solving the EU´s “democratic deficit” problem. 
The Parliament is presumed to increase the openness and transpar-
ency of the EU decision-making process, and decrease the distance 
between the EU and its citizens by translating their preferences and 
interests into EU legislation (Yordanova 2011:597).  
The ability of the EP to fulfill these goals is largely shaped by its 
internal organization, by its faculty to exploit its resources and insti-
tutional powers effectively and thus exert influence in the EU 
framework (Bowler and Farrell 1995:220f). Like most national legisla-
tures, the EP has a committee system that forms its “legislative back-
bone” (Whitaker 2011:1f). It is in the standing committees where the 
most of the EP´s legislative work is carried out, where parliamentary 
inquiries are executed and where individual Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament (MEPs) can exercise power. Previous research on 
the EP´s part in EU policy-making has shown that the EP committees 
“play a vital role in EU legislation” (Neuhold 2001:21), and that the 
EP´s positions are negotiated and in most case already decided at the 
committee stage of the parliamentary legislative process (Mamadouh 
and Raunio 2003:348; Yordanova 2009:254).  
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Owning to their increasing importance, the EP committees have 
recently attracted scholarly attention, including studies on the com-
position and assignments of the EP committees (Bowler and Farrell 
1995; McElroy 2006; Whitaker 2011; Yordanova 2009). However, 
although the EP committee membership can largely affect the type of 
legislation the EP adopts, it is still not clear how representative it is 
to the overall plenary (Yordanova 2009:254). Thus, even if a key 
question in committee studies is whether committees are representa-
tive of the legislatures they serve (McElroy 2006:6), and despite an 
increased awareness of the important role played by the EP commit-
tees. One research area that to date has been largely neglected is 
women´s representation in the EP committees.  
However, although women´s representation in the EP committees 
is a research area in which the knowledge remains limited, feminist 
theories of legislative organization is an established scholarly. Previ-
ous studies on women´s representation in national parliamentary 
committees have found that women, once they have been elected to 
Parliaments, often are found to be concentrated in certain types of 
committees. More specific, in committees that are concerned with 
issues related to what can be classified as typical “female”1. Addi-
tionally, it has also been found that women parliamentarians are 
significantly more likely to be assigned to health care and welfare 
committees than men, and less likely than men to be assigned to 
committees dealing with business and private economic concerns. 
(Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999) 
Thus, feminist theories of legislative organization focus on the num-
bers of women in Parliaments and highlights two questions in rela-
tion to women´s representation: first, where are women represented 
and, second, where are women not represented? By addressing these 
two questions, feminist theories of legislative organization gives 
indications of the way the power is distributed between women and 
men in Parliaments (Kantola 2009:380). Hence, women´s representa-
                                                          
1 The concepts female and male refers here to gender roles, see Chapter 3 for a further 
discussion. 
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tion in the EP committees is consequently linked to indications of the 
distribution of power between women and men within the EP. But, 
nonetheless, a systematic examination of the composition of women 
and men in the EP committees, and the effect of sex2 on assignments 
to the EP committees have yet to be undertaken.  
In this study, the composition of and assignments to, the EP 
committees will be examined in all direct elected EPs (seven in total). 
This study aims to test feminist theories of legislative organization 
on the EP committees, with the broader aim to increase the 
knowledge of women´s representation in the EP committees. The 
research questions are thus:  
 
 Are women MEPs more or less commonly found in certain types of 
EP Committees? 
 Does sex have an impact on the assignment of individual MEPs to 
EP committees? 
1.1 Disposition  
The study proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2, women´s political rep-
resentation is thorough theorized and discussed. The chapter begins 
with a presentation and discussion of feminist theories of women´s 
political representation, followed by an outlining of the development 
of women´s representation in the EP. A review of the relevant litera-
ture on women´s descriptive representation thereafter ends the chap-
ter. In Chapter 3, the EP committees are considered from both an 
empirical and a theoretical perspective. The chapter begins with an 
overview of the expansion of the EP committees, which is followed 
by a presentation of the formal EP committee assignment system. 
Thereafter follows a review of the relevant literature on EP commit-
tee assignments and a presentation and discussion of the feminist 
theories of legislative organization, and also a new proposed classifi-
                                                          
2 The concept sex refers here to the legal sex, which in this study is restricted to only 
two sexes, woman and man.  
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cation of the EP committees. A presentation of the derived hypothe-
ses and a discussion of the control variables included in the study 
thereafter end the chapter. In Chapter 4, the methodology of the 
empirical analysis of the study is outlined, and subsequently, in 
Chapter 5, the results are presented and analyzed. Lastly, in Chapter 
6, a discussion of the results and conclusions close the study.   
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2 Women´s political representa-
tion 
In the following chapter, women´s political representation is thor-
ough theorized and discussed. The first part of the chapter focuses 
on feminist theories of women´s political representation and estab-
lishes why this study’s focus, on the women MEPs in the EP commit-
tees, should matter. In the second part, the policies adopted by the 
EU to promote a balanced representation of women and men in the 
political decision-making process is presented and discussed. It is 
shown that the effectiveness of EU´s policies can be questioned. 
Thereafter, in the third part of the chapter, the development of wom-
en´s representation in the EP is mapped out, followed by a review of 
the relevant literature on women´s descriptive representation. The 
review shows that women´s representation in the EP committees is a 
research area that, even by feminist researches, has been largely ne-
glected. 
2.1 Theorizing women´s political representa-
tion 
For a long time, feminist scholars have debated the question: does it 
matter whether women are represented in Parliaments or not? Phil-
lips (1998) famously identified four arguments in support of wom-
en´s political representation: 1) the importance of symbolic represen-
tation, as women politicians act as role models for future candidates; 
2) numerically equal representation between women and men in 
Parliaments is a sing of justice; 3) women are positioned to represent 
women´s interests better than men; and 4) women´s political repre-
sentation renews democracy. Dovi (2007) later built upon this, and put 
forward two additional arguments: 5) the trust argument, which 
implies that women´s political representation is crucial for women´s 
confidence in political institutions; and 6) the legitimacy argument, 
Where did all the women go?
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which implies that the presence of women politicians strengthens the 
legitimacy of democratic institutions.  
Women´s political representation can thus be justified in its own 
terms: it is normatively desirable that Parliaments reflect the compo-
sition of women and men in society and include representatives 
from both sexes (Kantola 2009:380). On the other hand, it is also pos-
sible to stress the benefits that women´s political representation pro-
duces, by way of improving the deliberative process, increasing 
democratic legitimacy and reducing distrust (Mansbridge 1999:654). 
The point of departure for these arguments origins from the theory 
of politics of preference (Phillips 1995) which suggest that individu-
als’ interests are connected to experiences, which in turn are linked 
to sex. This is built upon the assumption that women and men have 
different experiences in their everyday life, and that women politi-
cians, at least to some extent, share the experiences of other women, 
and therefore are better equipped to represent the “interests of 
women” (Wängnerud 2009:52). In other words, the arguments pre-
dict a link between descriptive and substantive representation3, that 
is, a belief that women politicians will have a substantive impact on 
the political decision-making process. That women politicians´ rep-
resents the “interests of women” and therefore will affect public 
policy in favor for women. However, the expectation that an increas-
ing number of women in legislatures will result in more and better 
public policies for women, are not without problems.  
First, the relationship between descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation is hard to capture (Wängnerud 2009:59). In the feminist 
literature today, there is both a lack of agreement on what to expect 
when the number of women in Parliaments increases, and compet-
ing views on which share of the seats in Parliaments women need to 
occupy, for the impact of women´s presence will become apparent.  
                                                          
3 In research on women in Parliaments, there is a widely used distinction between 
substantive and descriptive representation. The distinction roughly corresponds with 
whether the focus is on the effects of women´s presence in Parliament or on the num-
ber of women in Parliament. (Wängnerud 2009:52) 
 
7 
 
Second, women are by no means a coherent group. Women par-
liamentarians have different experiences affecting their interests, for 
example ethnicity, class, age and sexual orientation, and it is not 
desirable, or even possible, to group the diversity of women´s expe-
riences into one single category of “women´s interests” (Kantola 
2009:381). However, in research on descriptive representation, far-
reaching definitions of women´s interests are not necessary 
(Wängnerud 2009:53). The focus is instead directed towards where 
women are represented and where not, and by addressing this issue, 
research on descriptive representation gives indications of the way 
that power is distributed between women and men in the political 
decision-making process (Kantola 2009:380).  
This study does not attempt to make claims about substantive 
representation of women or about constitution of gender in the polit-
ical representation process. Rather, this study’s focus on women´s 
representation in the EP committees is pertinent as it may give some 
indications of the way that power is distributed between women and 
men in the EP. Thus, women´s political representation in the EP 
committees is an important research area and its importance is also 
stressed by the fact the EU, over the two past decades, has adopted 
measures to improve women’s political representation in both the 
member states´ Parliaments and in the EU´s institutions. In the fol-
lowing section, the policies adopted by the EU to promote a balanced 
representation of women and men in the political decision-making 
process are presented and discussed. 
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2.2 Improving women´s political representa-
tion in Europe 
The EU has encompassed the agenda of balanced representation of 
women and men in the political decision-making process since the 
1990s. Initially, the EU´s first steps to advance equality between 
women and men were taken in the Treaties of Rome (1957) Article 
119, in which it was stipulated that men and women should receive 
equal pay for equal work. This initial step was though taken in an 
all-man environment and it was not until the preparation of the 
Equal Treatment Directive in 1976, that the first feminist actors were 
included in working groups (Hoskyns 1996:101f).4 
Although, since then, the EU´s view on women´s participation in 
political decision-making has altered dramatically. For example, the 
EP now states in one of its key documents in this issue, that equal 
participation of men and women in decision-making “strengthen 
democracy, by taking account of the interests of the whole of society, 
and promote its proper functioning” and as a result leads to more 
“efficient use of human resources” (European Parliament 2000:16). 
The EU has both been influenced by international developments, 
such as the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, and has itself been an 
important actor in pushing for balanced representation of women 
and men in political decision-making internationally (Kantola 
2009:383). 
The EU´s first action on women´s representation in political deci-
sion-making was taken with the adoption of the Third Action Pro-
gramme on Equal Opportunities (1991-1995), in which the im-
portance of the participation of women in political decision-making 
                                                          
4 During the formulation of Article 119, the Commission established a special “Article 
119” group, however, even if the documentation does not reveal who the members of 
this group were, Hoskyns (1996) argue that “it seems highly likely that they were 
almost entirely men.” due to the fact that, even ten years later, few women were in-
volved in working groups (Hoskyns 1996:62).  
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for equal opportunities policies was recognized for the first time.5 
This was later followed by the Council Resolution in 1995 on bal-
anced participation of women and men in decision-making, and the 
Council Recommendation in 1996 on the promotion of positive ac-
tion for achieving a balanced participation of women and men in the 
decision-making process (Council of the European Union 1996). 
Three years after the adopting of the Council Recommendation, nine 
indicators were established by the Council for measuring women’s 
participation in power structures. The indicators showed that partic-
ipation was far from being sufficient both at national and EU level. 
(European Parliament 2000:13) 
Further, in 2000 the Commission published a report on the im-
plementation of the Council Recommendation (European Commis-
sion 2000a). The Commission gave a new definition of balanced rep-
resentation and set 40 percent as the minimum level of participation 
of women or men in committees and expert groups. The Commis-
sion noted that there was a variation in the perception of balanced 
representation in the member states with the Nordic countries and 
the United Kingdom proposing 50 percent participation whereas the 
majority of countries considered a participation rate of at least 30 
percent to represent a balance. (European Commission 2000b) The 
Commission´s definition was thus a result of an increased frustration 
on the lack of implementation and due the fact that the Council Rec-
ommendation mentioned the need for “balanced representation” 
without defining in figures the term "balanced". 
Increasing the number of women in the political decision-making 
process was again brought up as one of the priorities in the Commis-
sion´s Roadmap to equality between women and men (2006-2010), 
and in the current Commission´s Strategy for equality between 
women and men (2010-2015), equality in the decision-making pro-
                                                          
5 In the first two Action Programmes, the emphasis was on equal opportunities at 
work. 
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cess is one of five priority areas.6 One of the key actions in the Com-
mission´s Strategy is to promote greater participation by women in 
EP elections, including as candidates, and particular in the 2014 EP 
election.  
As shown above, the EU has paid attention to the representation 
of women in the member states´ Parliaments and in the EU´s institu-
tions and demanded measures to increase it. However, the effective-
ness of these strategies can be questioned. For instance, the imple-
mentation of the Council Recommendation and the Council Resolu-
tion in the member states have been poor and the impact of these 
strategies limited (Kantola 2009:385). In many cases it has been a 
matter of interpretation and definition whether balanced representa-
tion of women and men has been achieved. The question is thus how 
women´s political representation looks like in the EP. In the follow-
ing section the development of women´s representation in the EP is 
mapped out, followed by a review of the relevant literature on wom-
en´s descriptive representation, which shows that the knowledge of 
women´s representation in the EP committees remains limited. 
2.3 Women in the EP 
Since 1979 when the EP was directly elected for the first time more 
and more women have gradually entered the Parliament. At the 
outset, the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (1952-1958) included one woman out of 78 representa-
tives (1.3 percent). This increased marginally to 3 percent in the Par-
liament of Six (1958-1972) and to 5.5 percent in 1978. (Norris and 
Franklin 1997:188) These MEPs where nominated by national legisla-
tures and the responsibility for the low representation of women 
rested with the national parliamentary parties. In this context, the 
1979 elections represented a breakthrough, resulting in an increase of 
                                                          
6 In December 2010, the Council adopted Conclusions in support for the implementa-
tion of the European Commission's Strategy for equality between women and men 
(2010-2015).  
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the number of women to 16 percent. The percentage of women MEPs 
has since then been increasing steadily to 35 percent in the current 7th 
EP, however nonetheless still lower than the Commission´s defini-
tion of balanced representation of women and men (40 percent). 
Diagram 1 displays the development of women´s representation in 
the EP from the 1st EP to the current 7th EP. 
 
Diagram 1 The development of women´s representation in the EP 
 
Source: The official website of the European Commission. 
Although the number of women MEPs has increased over the 
years, the number of women MEPs elected in the member states 
varies substantially. For example, in the current 7th EP, 62 percent of 
the Finnish and 50 percent of the Estonian MEPs are women, com-
pared to 18 percent of the Czech Republic and 17 percent of the Ital-
ian MEPs. Notably is also that Malta has not yet had any women 
MEPs (The official website of the European Commission). Further, 
even if women constitute 35 percent of the representatives in the 
current 7th EP, it is still at a higher level than in most of the member 
states´ national Parliaments. The average percentage of women par-
liamentarians in the current EU-27 is 26 percent, although in Hunga-
ry and Malta, for example, women only constitute 9 percent of the 
members of the Parliaments, compared to Sweden, where women 
constitute 44 percent (The official website of the European Commis-
sion).7 
                                                          
7 Single or Lower House of Parliament in the current EU-27. 
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2.3.1 Literature on women´s descriptive representation 
There is a large body of literature that has focused on the numbers of 
women in national Parliaments and developed explanations for 
cross-nation variations. Traditionally, feminist scholars have distin-
guished between supply-side and demand-side factors, where the 
former relating to the availability of women parliamentarians and 
the latter to their usage (Kantola 2009:387). For example, women´s 
resources including time, money and the levels of education and 
gainful employment among women may result in women being less 
able than men to contribute to campaigns, take on poorly paid posi-
tions in local or regional governments or finance their own cam-
paign. However, the focus of scholarly research in Europe has grad-
ually shifted, from women´s lack of resources or lack of will to par-
ticipate in politics, towards institutional and cultural explanations.  
It has been established that women do better in electoral system 
based on proportional representation and multi-member constituen-
cies, than majority system and single member constituencies. Fur-
ther, political parties have also been found to be important, as the 
variations in proportion between women and men are even greater 
across parties than across nations (Wängnerud 2009:54ff). Here, po-
litical ideology and party organization have found to play the lead-
ing roles, as parties on the left tend to send more women to Parlia-
ment and centralized organizations with ties to organizations out-
side the party are favorable for women, due to the fact that they pro-
vide more points of access. Other more cultural explanations empha-
size on socio-economic and socio-cultural factors such as economic 
development, secularization and the level of gender-equality, for the 
number of women elected. 
Thus, the EP is a very suitable object for studies on women´s rep-
resentation since there is a considerable heterogeneity in culture, 
economic conditions and political institutional set-up among the 
member states, which all has found to have an impact on the number 
of women elected to Parliaments. Owning up to its intriguingly, the 
EP has in recent years attracted feminist scholarly attention, which 
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seeks to explain why there are more women in the EP as opposed to 
many of the members states´ national Parliaments, including studies 
on factors related to institutional circumstances (Footitt 1998; 
Vallance and Davis 1986) and women´s policy network´s activism 
(Krook 2002; Lombardo and Meier 2007). However, although femi-
nist scholars have developed explanatory factors for both the num-
ber of women´s representatives in national Parliaments and in the 
EP, little or even no attention has been paid to the women inside the 
EP (Galligan and Clavero 2008:5). Thus, no questions have been 
asked in relation to what happens when women actually are in place 
in the EP, and to date, no study has so far sought to explain the in-
ternal organization of the EP from a feminist perspective. Galligan 
and Clavero (2008:6f) suggest that the lack of research addressing 
this issue may derive from the difficulty of applying models that 
have been developed at the national level to a supranational context. 
An added difficulty is that the EU is quite unique in many respects, 
since it has no other supranational comparator. As a result, women´s 
representation in the EP committees is not a well-researched area 
and the knowledge remains limited. But, as shown above, women´s 
representation in the EP committees is linked to indications of the 
distribution of power between women and men within the EP, and it 
is therefore essential that the knowledge of women´s representation 
in the EP committees increases. 
In summary, the EU has embraced the agenda of balanced repre-
sentation of women and men in the political decision-making pro-
cess since the 1990s, although the effectiveness of the policies adopt-
ed by the EU has been questioned (Kantola 2009:385). For instance, 
even if women occupy a higher percentage of the seats in the current 
7th EP than the average percentage of the seats in the national Par-
liaments in the current EU-27 (35 percent compared to 26 percent), 
the percentage of women in the current 7th EP is nonetheless still 
lower than the Commission´s definition of balanced representation 
of women and men (40 percent). 
Further, feminist scholars have for a long time focused on the 
numbers of women in national Parliaments and developed explana-
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tions for cross-nation variations. In recent years, feminist scholarly 
have also directed their attention to the numbers of women elected 
to the EP in comparison to the national Parliaments, and developed 
explanatory factors for variations. However, little or no attention has 
been paid to what happens when women actually are in place in the 
EP, thus research on women´s representation in the EP committees 
has, even by feminist researches, been largely neglected. But, the 
importance of research and increased knowledge in this area is un-
derlined by the fact that women´s representation in the EP commit-
tees is linked to indications of the distribution of power between 
women and men within the EP. 
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3 The EP committees from an 
empirical to a theoretical per-
spective  
In this chapter, the EP committees are considered from both an em-
pirical and a theoretical perspective. The first part of the chapter 
shows the expansion of the EP committees and a presentation of the 
formal EP assignment system. It is shown that there is no formal rule 
that require that the composition of women and men in the EP com-
mittees should reflect the composition of women and men in the 
overall plenary. Thereafter, in the second part, the relevant literature 
on EP committee assignments is reviewed. The review shows that no 
study on EP committee assignments so far, has fully explored the 
impact of sex on the assignment of individual members to the EP 
committees. In the third part of the chapter, feminist theories of leg-
islative organization are applied on the EP. First, a discussion re-
garding how this study relates to the concepts of “female” policy 
areas and “male” policy areas precedes the presentation of feminist 
theories of legislative organization. Thereafter, the classification of 
the EP committees and the derived hypotheses are presented. A dis-
cussion on the control variables included in the study ends the chap-
ter. 
3.1 Overview of the EP committees 
Committees have played a central role in the EP since the institution 
was first established as the Common Assembly of the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1952. The Common Assembly recognized 
that committees would help facilitate the problems inbuilt in coordi-
nating work in an assembly that only was scheduled to meet in ple-
nary a handful of times a year. For this purpose, it created seven 
committees to conduct Assembly business. (McElroy 2006:8; Whita-
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ker 2011:26). However, it was not until the immediate aftermath of 
the first direct elections in 1979 that the committee system was sig-
nificant expanded and developed (McElroy 2006:8). Thereafter, the 
range of committees expanded gradually, from 17 committees in the 
1st EP to 20 committees in the 4th EP. Although, following the 1999 
June elections, the number of committees was reduced from 20 to 17 
as a part of streamlining of the EP´s committee system (Whitaker 
2011:29). This alternation was though reversed in the 6th EP, when 
the number of committees again increased to 20.8 Table 1 shows the 
expansion of the EP committees from the 1st EP to the current 7th EP 
(see Appendix 1 for a detailed overview of the EP committees), and 
the enlargement of the EU from 10 member states in the 1st EP to 27 
member states in the current 7th EP  
Table 1 Committee expansion of the EP from 1979 to 2009 
 1st EP 
(1979-
1984) 
2nd EP 
(1984-
1989) 
3rd EP 
(1989-
1994) 
4th EP 
(1994-
1999) 
5th EP 
(1999-
2004) 
6th EP 
(2004-
2009) 
7th EP 
(2009- ) 
No. of  
committees 17 18 19 20 17 20 20 
No. of MEPs 434 518 518 626 788 732 754 
Total no.  
of committee 
seats 
523 599 651 768 876 861 848 
Average  
committee 
size 
31 33 34 38 52 43 42 
No. of  
Member 
states 
10 12 12 15 25 25 27 
Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009). 
Table 1 also displays that the size of the EP committees has in-
creased over time. Average committee size rose from 31 members in 
the 1st EP to 52 members in the 5th EP. However, in the 6th EP, the 
                                                          
8 For a more detailed overview of the development of the EP ´s committee system, see 
for example Whitaker (2011). 
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average committee size decreased to 43 members and in the current 
7th EP, the average committee size is 42 members. Although average 
committee size has varied over time, sizes vary even more signifi-
cantly across committees within the same parliamentary term. For 
example, in the current 7th EP the Legal Affairs committee and Fish-
eries committee is composed of mere 25 members whereas the For-
eign Affairs committee has 75 members. 
The importance of the committee system is underlined by a sur-
vey of MEPs in 2010. When asked to choose their first preference 
from among the EP posts of Group President, National Delegation 
Leader, President of the EP or Committee Chair, more respondents 
opted for an EP committee chair rather than any of the other alterna-
tives (Farrell et al. 2011).9 Thus, MEPs clearly value committee posts 
and consider that the EP committees are important arenas of power 
that matters to the legislate process within the EP (McElroy 2006:8).  
3.1.1 The committee assignment system of the EP 
The majority of MEPs serve on one committee as full members and 
on another as substitutes. However, multiple memberships are pos-
sible since the number of available committee seats always exceeds 
the number of parliamentarians (see Table 1) and not all MEPs are 
members in a committee. Officially, committee seats are assigned in 
a plenary vote every two and a half years. However, in practice, they 
are distributed before the plenary stage (Bowler and Farrell 1995:226; 
Mamadouh and Raunio 2003:338). The only reference in the EP Rules 
of Procedure states that:  
“Members of committees and committees of inquiry 
shall be elected after nominations have been submitted 
by the political groups and the non-attached Members. 
                                                          
9 Of the respondents, 33% opted for committee chair as their first preference, com-
pared with 29% opting for what would apparently seem to be the most prestigious 
parliamentary post, the presidency of the Parliament. Only 21% opted for leadership 
of their political group or leading their national delegation. (Farrell et al. 2011) 
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The Conference of Presidents shall submit proposals to 
Parliament. The composition of the committees shall, as 
far as possible, reflect the composition of Parliament.” 
(Rule 186; EP, 2013) 
The leaders of the EP party groups, together with the President of 
the EP, constitute the Conference of Presidents, which for each 
committee propose the number of seats and the allocation of seats 
between the EP party groups according to the political composition 
of the plenary, using the D'Hondt method. Thus, seats are allocated 
to the EP party groups proportionally to their size in the plenary. 
Thereafter, it is the EP party groups that internally decide on indi-
vidual assignments, taking into consideration the sizes and wishes of 
their constituent national party delegation (Yordanova 2009:257)  
The EP party groups do not apply any formal rules in the selec-
tion process, and past research on the 6th EP has revealed some dif-
ferences in the procedure in the different groups. For example, in the 
big groups (Group of the European People's Party (Christian Demo-
crats) and European Democrats, and Group of the Party of European 
Socialists), seats are first distributed among the national party dele-
gations and thereafter, individual seats are allocated within respec-
tive delegation. In the Liberal group (Group of the Alliance of Liber-
als and Democrats for Europe), the procedure is instead that each 
national delegation shall be allowed one committee seat, and then if 
there are any seats left, delegations can have another. Subsequently, 
once members have expressed their preferences for committee mem-
bership, the distribution of seats is done by the Bureau of the group. 
In the Green group (Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance) it 
is instead almost solely the members’ individual interests that decide 
the assignment of seats in the committees. (Yordanova 2009:257)   
To summaries, the above overview of the EP committee system 
shows that the range of the EP committees has expanded gradually 
since the 1st EP. Moreover, the majority of the MEPs are full mem-
bers in one committee, and although the EP committees are im-
portant areas in which MEPs can exercise power within the EP, there 
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are no formal rules that require that the composition of women and 
men in the EP committees should reflect the composition of women 
and men in the overall plenary. After the Conference of Presidents 
has allocated seats to the EP party groups, according to the political 
composition of the plenary, the informal rules of the EP party groups 
determine individual committee assignments. As displayed above, 
these rules have shown to differ in different EP party groups. The 
question is thus what lays besides the formal and informal rules, 
hence, which factors that affect individual EP committee assign-
ments. In the following section the relevant literature on EP commit-
tee assignments is reviewed. It is shown that although past studies 
on EP committee assignments have puzzled out some of the factors 
affecting individual committee assignments, no study has so far fully 
explored the impact of sex on the assignment of individual members 
to the EP committees. 
3.2 Literature on the EP committee assign-
ments  
Due to the similarities between the EP and the United State (US) 
Congress10, a strong committee system twinned with relatively un-
disciplined parties in a legislature with no government resting on a 
vote of no confidence (Yoshinaka et al. 2010:458), previous research 
on EP committee assignments has to a large extended relied on the 
theoretical literature on the US legislature (Yordanova 2011:599f). In 
line with this literature, the majority of previous studies have asked 
question in relation to the predictions of either distribution, informa-
tional or partisan theory. Thus examined if MEPs join EP committees 
in order to: exercise distortional influence over the policy area they 
serve, enhance the EPs efficiency by serving the informational needs 
of the plenary, or if the control over committee assignments lays in 
hands of the EP party group leaders.  
                                                          
10 For a deeper discussion on the similarities between the EP and the US Congress, see 
McElroy (2007). 
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Bowler and Farrell (1995) found from their groundbreaking study 
on the 3rd EP (1989-1994), evidence that identified occupational and 
interests group attachments as “the only consistently significant de-
terminants driving committee membership.” (Bowler and Farrell 
1995:234) Similarly, McElroy (2006) showed that policy expertise 
played a role in the assignment of members to the committees on 
Legal Affairs, Environment and Public Health and Industry in the 5th 
EP (1999-2004), suggesting that MEPs with relevant policy expertise 
or links to relevant interests groups are more likely than others to 
obtain an assignment in, at least, those committees. Further, 
Yordanova (2009) also found, in her study on the 6th EP (2004-2009), 
support for the importance of relevant expertise and interests for 
assignments to a wide range of committees. Yordanova showed that 
MEPs with relevant expertise were more likely to join committees 
that require technical knowledge, and that MEPs with special inter-
ests where more likely to join a committee whose area of operation 
addressed their interests. Additionally, Bowler and Farrell, McElroy 
and Yordanova all concluded in their studies that the composition of 
the EP committees, with minor expectations, were largely propor-
tional to the partisan and national composition of the plenary. 
To summarize, much of the previous research on committee as-
signments in the EP suggests that MEPs expertise and personal in-
terests may be good predictors of committee assignments. As the 
2010 survey of MEPs in the current 7th EP (2009- ) has shown, the 
most important factor affecting MEPs committee assignments are: 
the importance of the issues that a committee covers (47.5%) and 
their professional expertise (45.5%), followed by their personal 
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interests (38.4%) (Farrell et al. 2011).11 However, although past stud-
ies have largely deepened and increased our knowledge about the 
organizational principles of the EP committees and provided some 
answers to the question of which factors that affect individual EP 
committee assignments, the whole rationale behind is still not clear. 
As Chapter 2 showed, research on women´s representation in the EP 
committees has to date, even by feminist explorations, been largely 
neglected. Consequently, no study has so far fully explored the im-
pact of sex on the assignment of individual members to the EP com-
mittees.  
There are at least to two explanations for this. First, the theoretical 
literature on the US legislature does not treat sex as an important 
and prominent factor of individual committee assignments. Second, 
the EP is at the supranational level, while the feminist models of 
legislative organizational have been developed at the national level, 
an added difficulty in applying models on the national level to the 
EP, is that the EP has no other supranational comparator. Thus, 
when applying models developed at the national level to the EP, a 
series of methodological problems arises. For example, the EP oper-
ates, in difference to national parliaments, in a multi-nation, multi-
party EP setting with MEPs with strong electoral dependence on 
their national parties (Yordanova 2009:261). But in order to develop 
the knowledge of women´s representation in the EP committees and 
fully examine the impact of sex on the assignment of individual 
members to the EP committees, feminist theories of legislative organ-
ization needs to be tested on the EP committees. 
Furthermore, although the feminists theories are developed at the 
national level, the adaptability of the feminist theories to the EP can 
still be very fruitful, since the feminist theories solely suggest that 
                                                          
11 Of the respondents, 47.5% opted for the importance of the issues that the committee 
covers as extremely important for committee choice, 45.5% opted for their professional 
expertise, 38.4% opted for their personal interests, 34.5% opted for the importance to 
their voters, 12.5% opted for previous membership in the last EP, 7.4% opted for being 
asked by their national party and 6.9% opted for being asked by their EP party group 
(Farrell et al. 2011). 
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the composition of, and assignments to, parliamentary committees 
can be explain by gender-roles, hence, of what can be expected being 
“female” or “male” policy areas (Wängnerud 1999).12 Thus, the dif-
ferences can therefore serve as a basis for discussion of the explana-
tory power and adaptability of the feminist theories to the suprana-
tional context. Another factor which enable the adaptability the fem-
inist theories to the EP is that all direct elected EPs are included in 
this study, thus by including all direct elected EPs, it is possible to 
compare the different EPs with each other and see if any patterns 
emerges in the data that can be generalized on future EPs. 
In the following section, the feminist theories of legislative organ-
ization are presented, followed by a classification of the EP commit-
tees and the derived hypotheses. However, first, it needs to be dis-
cussed how this study relates to the concepts of “female” and “male” 
policy areas, a discussion which we now turn to.  
3.3 Application of feminist theories of legisla-
tive organization to the EP 
Feminist theories of legislative organization suggest that policy areas 
are linked to gender-roles. That some policy areas are linked to what 
can be seen as “female” while other policy areas are linked to what 
can be seen as “male”. Thus, suggesting that is exist a gendered divi-
sion between different policy areas, hence a division between “fe-
male” policy areas and “male” policy areas.  
However, the usage of the labels “female” and “male” in relation 
to different policy areas are not without problems. ”Female” and 
“male” are vague concepts and every attempt to categorize policy 
areas on the basis of them, runs the risk to reproduce preconceptions 
about the different sexes. Hence, the aim here is not to define which 
policy areas that is ”female” or “male”, through some, for example, 
idea about sameness or difference between the sexes. The categoriza-
tion that is made is merely to test feminist research of legislative 
                                                          
12 For a different view see Heath et al. (2005).  
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tees and the derived hypotheses. However, first, it needs to be dis-
cussed how this study relates to the concepts of “female” and “male” 
policy areas, a discussion which we now turn to.  
3.3 Application of feminist theories of legisla-
tive organization to the EP 
Feminist theories of legislative organization suggest that policy areas 
are linked to gender-roles. That some policy areas are linked to what 
can be seen as “female” while other policy areas are linked to what 
can be seen as “male”. Thus, suggesting that is exist a gendered divi-
sion between different policy areas, hence a division between “fe-
male” policy areas and “male” policy areas.  
However, the usage of the labels “female” and “male” in relation 
to different policy areas are not without problems. ”Female” and 
“male” are vague concepts and every attempt to categorize policy 
areas on the basis of them, runs the risk to reproduce preconceptions 
about the different sexes. Hence, the aim here is not to define which 
policy areas that is ”female” or “male”, through some, for example, 
idea about sameness or difference between the sexes. The categoriza-
tion that is made is merely to test feminist research of legislative 
                                                          
12 For a different view see Heath et al. (2005).  
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organization on the EP committees, and not to comment about ”fe-
male” or “male” per se.  
The following parts of this section are presented as followed. 
First, previous research on women´s representation in parliamentary 
committees is presented. Thereafter, a new classification of the EP 
committees based on the concept pair reproduction/production is pro-
posed, followed by the derived hypotheses and a discussion on the 
control variables included in the study.  
3.3.1 Female and male policy areas 
Previous empirical studies on women´s representation in parliamen-
tary committees have shown that women, once they have been elect-
ed to Parliaments, often are found to be concentrated in certain types 
of committees. More specific, in committees that are concerned with 
issues related to what can be classified as typical “female” policy 
areas.  
Some of the first researchers that drew attention to this phenome-
non were the authors to the book Unfinished Democracy – Women in 
Nordic Politics, in which the authors, among other things, studied the 
composition of women and men in the Nordic countries13 parliamen-
tary committees, from the 1960s to the 1980s. The authors found that 
women parliamentarians often were seated in social affairs and edu-
cation committees and held up a significant lower number of seats in 
finance and economy committees. Hence, the author concluded that 
women were allocated seats to committees dealing with issues con-
nected with the traditional women´s role and that men were as-
signed to committees focusing on issues that have traditionally fallen 
within the men´s sphere. (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985) 
The same pattern was later found by other feminist researchers. 
Thomas (1994), which is a pioneer of empirical research on sex and 
committee assignments, showed in her study on the U.S state-level 
where she followed the development overtime, that women were 
                                                          
13 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.  
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significantly overrepresented in social political committees, tradi-
tionally “female-oriented” committees and underrepresented in 
committees that were concerned with business and private economy, 
traditionally “male-oriented” committees. Thomas showed that 
women representatives, in the 1970s, were concentrated in a narrow 
set of committee assignments, usually education committees. How-
ever, in 1988 this situation had changed, and women were found in 
all of the committees, although the proportion of women and men 
were not equal in all types of committees. Thomas found that wom-
en were significantly more likely than men to be members in health 
care and welfare committees, and less likely than men, to be mem-
bers in committees dealing with business and private economic con-
cerns. Further, the pattern was similar when Thomas broke down the 
aggregated data by state. In eleven out of twelve states, women were 
found more often than men in health care and welfare committees. 
In contrast, in nine of twelve states, women were less often than men 
found in business committees. (Thomas 1994:65f)  
Similarly, Wängnerud (1999) found, in her study of the Swedish 
Parliament from 1971 to 1996, where she focused on committee as-
signments to the standing committees that women parliamentarians 
were overrepresented and underrepresented in different types of 
committees. In her study, Wängnerud classified the committees 
based on the concept pair reproduction/production, on what can be 
expected being “female” and “male”, creating four groups in which 
the committees were placed in: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic 
functions and Economic/Technic. Wängnerud found that women 
more often were assigned to committees in the Social welfare and 
Culture/Law group, than men. In contrast, men were more often 
than women assigned to committees in the Basic functions and Eco-
nomic/Technic group. However, Social welfare and Econom-
ic/Technic were the two most sex characterized groups, where 
women in the former were most overrepresented and in the latter 
most underrepresented. Wängnerud concluded that there existed a 
clear sex-pattern, and suggested that the differences in the composi-
tions of women and men in the different groups were dependent on 
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which policy areas the committees was concerned with, that is, typi-
cal “female-oriented” policy areas or typical “male-oriented” policy 
areas. However, Wängnerud also concluded that the pattern was 
decreasing over time and that it in the 1994 election was broken. In a 
later study of the Swedish Parliament, Wängnerud (2009) confirmed 
this conclusion, when she found that women only were underrepre-
sented, occupying less than 40 percent of the seats, in one of the 
standing committees, namely the committee on social insurance, a 
formerly heavily “female” dominated policy area (Wängnerud 
2009:61). 
To summarize, previous research has shown that women parlia-
mentarians more often than men parliamentarians, are seated in 
committees concerned with issues connected to typical “female-
oriented” policy areas. The other side of the coin is that men parlia-
mentarians more often than women parliamentarians are seated in 
committees that are concerned with issues focusing on typical “male-
oriented” policy areas. The question is thus if the same pattern can 
be found in the EP committees.  
3.3.2 Classification of the EP Committees  
In order to make visible which of the EP committees that is expected 
to be concerned with typical “female-oriented” or typical “male-
oriented” policy areas, the EP committees need to be classified. Here, 
the classification scheme of Wängnerud (1999) is used and the fol-
lowing categorization of the EP committees will thus depart from the 
concept pair reproduction/production. 
A continuum between reproduction and production  
Reproduction and production represents two extreme values on a 
continuum between of what can be expected being “female” and 
“male”, and are commonly used concepts when women´s and men´s 
different positions in the society are analyzed (Rhode 1992:157; 
Wängnerud 1999:62). Reproduction refers to what in a broad sense 
can be said being the caring tasks in the society: care of children and 
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old, care of sick people et cetera. Traditionally, reproduction has 
been a “female” responsibility area and it has also been an area that 
to a great extent been connected to the family and the private sphere. 
Production, on the other hand, refers to what in a broad sense can be 
said being the society´s production of goods, and has in another way 
been connected to the public sphere. It has also, traditionally, been a 
“male” responsibility area.  
The EP committees have been divided into the four groups: Social 
welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic. The 
Social welfare and Economic/Technic groups represented the two 
extremities (see Wängnerud 1999:62f). The EP committees that are 
expected to be concerned with typical “female-oriented” policy areas 
have been place in the Social welfare group, while the EP committees 
that are expected to be concerned with typical “male-oriented” poli-
cy areas have been placed in the Economic/Technic group. The EP 
committees placed in the two groups in the middle, Culture/Law 
and Basic functions are expected to be concern with less gender 
characterized policy areas.  
Thus, the EP committees that have been placed in the Social wel-
fare group are concerned with social welfare policies, such as em-
ployment and social affairs policies et cetera, policies which are seen 
as typical “female”, while the EP committees that have been placed 
in the Economic/Technic group are concerned with economic and 
technic policies, such as international trade and budgets policies et 
cetera, policies which are seen as typical “male”. The EP committees 
placed in the Culture/Law group are concerned with culture and 
law policies, such as civil liberties, justice and home affairs policies et 
cetera, policies that are seen as more “female” than “male”, but not 
as gendered as the social welfare policies. Finally, the EP committees 
placed in the Basic functions group are concerned with policies con-
nected to the basic functions of the EU, such as regional develop-
ment policies et cetera, policies that are seen as more “male” than 
“female”, but not as gendered as the economic and technic policies. 
The dimension between reproduction and production is illustrat-
ed in Table 2. Table 2 also shows in which of the four groups: Social 
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welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the 
different EP committees have been placed in. However, the classifi-
cation offered in Table 2, only show the classification of the EP in the 
6th and 7th EP, for the classification of the EP committees in the 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th EP see Appendix 2. 
In Table 2, there is also a description of the different EP commit-
tees´ responsibilities. The description is to enable a critical assess-
ment of the classification that has been made. Although the follow-
ing classification of the EP committees was the one who was found 
to be most justified, one must still be aware that the classification 
probably will affect the study´s results.  
Table 2 Classification of the EP committees based on a contin-
uum between reproduction and production and a de-
scription of the EP committees responsibilities  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development 
 Employment and 
Social Affairs 
 Environment, 
Public Health and 
Food Safety  
 Internal Market 
and Consumer 
Protection 
 Women´s Rights 
and Gender Equal-
ity 
 Civil Liberties, 
Justice and 
Home Affairs  
 Constitutional 
Affairs 
 Culture and 
Education 
 Legal Affairs 
 Petitions 
 Agriculture and 
Rural Development 
 Fisheries  
 Foreign Affairs 
 Regional Develop-
ment 
 Transport and 
Tourism 
 Budgets  
 Budgetary Control 
 Economic and 
Monetary Affairs 
 Industry, Research 
and Energy 
 International Trade 
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Social welfare: Employment and Social Affairs committee is responsible for employ-
ment policy and all aspects of social policy; Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety committee is responsible for environmental policy and public health and food 
safety issues; Internal Market and Consumer Protection committee is responsible for 
coordination at Community level of national legislation and protection of the economic 
interests of consumers; Development committee is responsible for the, implementation 
and monitoring of the development and cooperation policy of the EU; Women´s Rights 
and Gender Equality committee is responsible for the definition, promotion and protec-
tion of women's rights in the EU and related Community measures.  
Culture/Law: Culture and Education committee is responsible for the cultural aspects 
of the EU and the EU's education policy; Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
committee is responsible for the protection within the territory of the EU of citizens' 
rights, human rights and fundamental rights, including the protection of minorities; 
Legal Affairs committee is responsible for the interpretation and application of Europe-
an law, compliance of EU acts with primary law; Constitutional Affairs committee is 
responsible or  the institutional aspects of the European integration process; Petitions 
committee is responsible for petitions and relations with the European Ombudsman. 
Basic functions: Transport and Tourism committee is responsible for matters relating 
to the development of a common policy for inter alia rail, road, and air transport and 
tourism; Agriculture and Rural Development committee is responsible for the operation 
and development of the common agricultural policy and rural development; Fisheries 
committee is responsible for the operation and development of the common fisheries 
policy and the conservation of fishery resources; Regional Development committee is 
responsible for regional and cohesion policy; Foreign Affairs committee is responsible 
for the common foreign and security policy and the European security and defense 
policy.  
Economic/Technic: International Trade committee is responsible for matters relating 
to the implementation of the Union's common commercial policy and its external eco-
nomic relations; Economic and Monetary Affairs committee  is responsible for the 
economic and monetary policies of the EU; Budgets committee is responsible for the 
multiannual financial framework of the EU revenue and expenditure; Industry, Re-
search and Energy committee is responsible for the EU's industrial policy and the 
application of new technologies; Budgetary Control committee is responsible for  the 
control of the implementation of the budget of the EU and of the European Develop-
ment Fund. 
Source: The official EP website.  
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3.3.3 Hypotheses 
In the outset of the study, the two broad research questions to be 
answered were stipulated: are women MEPs more or less commonly 
found in certain types of EP committees?; and does sex have an impact on 
the assignment of individual members to EP committees? Derived from 
the feminist theory of legislative organization, the following set of 
hypotheses will more precisely be employed in the analysis trying to 
answer the research questions. The first set of hypotheses (H1a and 
H2b) will be employed in answering the first research question and 
the second set of hypotheses (H2a, H2b, H2c and H2d) will be em-
ployed in answering the second research question.  
From overrepresented to underrepresented 
Linking the feminist research on legislative organization to the clas-
sification of the EP committees offered in Table 2, it is tested whether 
the two extremities groups, Social welfare and Economic/Technic, 
are more sex characterized then the two groups in the middle, Cul-
ture/Law and Basic functions. This leads to the following hypothe-
ses: 
 
H1a: Women MEPs are more overrepresented in EP committees in 
the Social welfare group than in EP committees in the Culture/Law 
group.  
 
H1b: Women MEPs are more underrepresented in EP committees in 
the Economic/Technic group than in EP committees in the Basic 
functions group.  
EP committee assignments on the individual level 
Although women MEPs may be more or less overrepresented or 
underrepresented in the different groups, it is still needed to be test-
ed if sex has an impact on the individual assignments to the EP 
committees. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
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H2a: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is increased by being a woman. 
 
H2b: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group is neither increased nor decreased by being a 
woman. 
 
H2c: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions groups is neither decreased nor increased by being a 
woman. 
 
H2d: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the 
Economic/Technic group is decreased by being a woman. 
3.3.4 Control variables 
The above hypotheses examine a bivariate relationship between sex 
and EP committee assignments, and although a bivariate relation-
ship in an uncontrolled setting is suboptimal, it is not useless. By 
examine the relationship between two variables, an independent 
variable and a dependent variable, it is possible to establish if it ex-
ists an association, and if it does, the strengthen and direction of the 
association between the two variables can be determined (Bryman 
2008:325f). Consequently, having a model with only sex as a predic-
tor of EP committee assignments will enable to establish if it exists an 
association, and if so, the strengthen and direction of the association 
can be determined. Thus, this study´s intention is not to establish the 
whole rationale behind EP committee assignments by puzzling out 
all the factors affecting it. Instead, the intention is merely to examine 
the relationship between sex and individual assignments to EP 
committees, in order to establish if sex has, or has not, an impact.  
However, it is also true that having a model with some control 
variables is better, as it allows an association to be controlled for 
spurious correlation, and specifies different conditions under which 
the original bivariate relationship might hold (Bryman 2008:330f). In 
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the review of the literature on women´s descriptive representation in 
Chapter 2, it was shown that political parties have found to be an 
important factor in explaining the number of women parliamentari-
ans, as parties on the left tend to send more women to Parliament 
(Wängnerud 2009:54ff). However, although previous research on EP 
committee assignments has thus found that the compositions of the 
EP committees, with minor expectations, been largely proportional 
to the partisan composition of the plenary, the EP party groups are 
still an important factor in the assignment process to EP committees. 
Therefore, EP party group will be included in this study as a control 
variable. Additionally, by including EP party group as a control var-
iable, it will be possible to see if previous researchers´ observation also 
can be found in this study´s new classification of the EP committees. 
Furthermore, in the review, it was also shown that other factors, 
such as the electoral system, economic development, secularization 
and the level of gender-equality, all have found to have an impact on 
the number of women elected to Parliament. By including nationality 
as a control variable in this study, all of these factors above will thus 
be controlled for, due to the fact that the variable nationality includes 
all the above factors. Although it will not in this study be evident 
which of the above factors that might have an effect on the dependent 
variables since the factors are not examined separately. Additionally, 
by including nationality as a control variable, it will also be possible to 
see if previous researchers´ observation, which holds that the composi-
tions of the EP committees, with minor expectations, are largely pro-
portional to the national composition of the plenary, can be found in 
this stud’s new classification of the EP committees. A more detailed 
discussion of the usage of the control variables is provided in the fol-
lowing Methodology chapter (Chapter 4).   
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4 Methodology 
In this chapter, the collection and usage of the data employed in this 
study is presented. In the first part of the chapter, a review of the 
data collection process precedes a presentation of the coding of the 
variables. Thereafter, in the second part, the statistical tools which 
will be employed to test the derived hypotheses are presented and 
argued for. First, the statistical tool cross tabulation, which will be 
used to test the 1st set of hypotheses is presented. Thereafter, the 
statistical tool logistic regression, which will be used to test the 2nd 
set of hypotheses, is presented and the construction of the models 
are explained. 
4.1 Data and measures 
The data for this study consists of both an original and a secondary 
dataset. The original dataset contains of data on the MEPs in the 
second term of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th EP and the secondary 
data set contains of data on the MEPs in the first term of the 6th EP. 
The data is on the individual level.  
The original datasets were collected from the official EP website. 
All MEPs have been coded manually by going through the lists of 
MEPs in the different EPs. The data on the MEPs in the 7th EP were 
collected in August 2012 and the data on the MEPs in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 
4th and 5th EP were collected from February to April 2013. The sec-
ondary dataset consist of Yordanova´s (2009) replication data. The 
dataset was used by Yordanova in an article published in European 
Union Politics journal and the replication data is available online. 
However, as the data collection for the original dataset has been 
carried out manually, it is possible that occasional coding errors oc-
cur in the original dataset. 
Together, the original and secondary data sets include data on the 
individual level of the MEPs in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th EP. 
The codebook is provided in Appendix 4.  
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dataset. The original dataset contains of data on the MEPs in the 
second term of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th EP and the secondary 
data set contains of data on the MEPs in the first term of the 6th EP. 
The data is on the individual level.  
The original datasets were collected from the official EP website. 
All MEPs have been coded manually by going through the lists of 
MEPs in the different EPs. The data on the MEPs in the 7th EP were 
collected in August 2012 and the data on the MEPs in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 
4th and 5th EP were collected from February to April 2013. The sec-
ondary dataset consist of Yordanova´s (2009) replication data. The 
dataset was used by Yordanova in an article published in European 
Union Politics journal and the replication data is available online. 
However, as the data collection for the original dataset has been 
carried out manually, it is possible that occasional coding errors oc-
cur in the original dataset. 
Together, the original and secondary data sets include data on the 
individual level of the MEPs in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th EP. 
The codebook is provided in Appendix 4.  
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4.1.1 The dependent variables  
The dependent variables are actual EP committee membership. More 
specific, membership in an EP committee in a named group, that is, 
in the Social welfare group, Culture/Law group, Basic functions 
group or Economic/Technic group, coded as 1 for being member in 
an EP committee in a named group and 0 otherwise. The dependent 
variables are thus coded in four separate binary variables.  
An alternative way to code EP committee membership in a named 
group, could have been to code it in one nominal variable (for exam-
ple Social welfare = 1, Culture/Law = 2, Basic functions =3, Econom-
ic/Technic = 4). However, coding membership that way require that 
the MEPs solely are members in an EP committee in one of the 
groups, and as some MEPs are members in an EP committee in two 
or more groups, coding EP committee membership in a named 
group in one dependent variable is thus not possible.  
4.1.2 The independent variable 
The independent variable is the MEPs sex. With sex refers here to the 
legal sex, which in this study is restricted to only two sexes, woman 
and man. Women MEPs are coded as 1 and men MEPs are coded as 0.  
4.1.3 The control variables 
The control variable nationality is coded in a series of dummy varia-
bles, coded as 1 for being from a named member state and 0 other-
wise. For example, MEPs from Sweden are coded as 1, while MEPs 
from another member state are coded as 0, MEPs from Spain are 
coded as 1, while MEPs from another member state are coded as 0, 
and so on for all member states. The United Kingdom will be used as 
reference group in the logistic regressions.  
The control variable EP party group is also coded in a series of 
dummy variables. However, since many of the EP party groups 
change their name over the examined time span, and some smaller 
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EP party groups only exists under one or two parliamentary terms, 
the EP party groups have been classified into five categories, de-
pending on their ideological affiliation. The classification scheme of 
Hix et al. (2009) has been used to classify the different EP party 
groups.   
The EP party groups have been classified into the five categories: 
Radical left, where the EP party groups with radical left ideological 
affiliations been placed; Socialists, where the EP party groups with 
socialist ideological affiliations been placed; Liberals, where the EP 
party groups with liberal ideological affiliations been placed; Con-
servatives, where the EP party groups with conservative ideological 
affiliations been placed; and Others, where the smaller EP party 
groups and none-attached members been placed. The coding of the 
EP party group variable is the same as for the control variable na-
tionality. The group Others will be used as reference group in the 
logistic regressions. See Appendix 3 for the classification of the EP 
party groups.  
4.2 Statistical tools 
To test the hypotheses derived from the feminist theory of legislative 
organization, the statistical tools cross tabulation and logistic regres-
sion are used. The tests are run in SPSS.  
4.2.1 Cross tabulation  
The statistical tool employed to test Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 
1b is cross tabulation of the independent variable sex with the de-
pendent variables, membership in an EP committee in a named 
group. The cross tabulations will provide an comparisons of the ob-
served percentage of women MEPs in the different groups and it is 
therefore reasonable to use the average percentage of women in all 
EP committees as reference point.14 An underrepresentation of women 
                                                          
14 Compare the design used by Wängnerud (1999) and Thomas (1994).  
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will thus mean that the percentage of women MEPs in a certain 
group is lower than the average percentage of women in all EP 
committees. The other way around, an overrepresentation of women 
will occur when the percentage of women in a certain group is high-
er than the average percentage of women in all EP committees.  
4.2.2 Logistic regression  
Due to the fact that the dependent variables are binary, the statistical 
tool logistic regression will be used to test Hypothesis 2a, Hypothesis 
2b, Hypothesis 2c and Hypothesis 2d.  
There are two main uses of logistic regression: 1) prediction of 
group membership, since logistic regression calculates the probabil-
ity that an event will occur; and 2) examine the relationship and 
strengths among variables, for example being a woman MEP puts 
you at a higher probability to be assigned to an EP committee in a 
named group, than being a man MEP. (Menard 2010:14ff) However, 
due to the fact that logistic regression calculates the changes in the 
log odds of the dependent variable, and not changes in the value of 
the dependent variable as ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
does, the b coefficients in logistic regression are reported as log odds, 
which are not as easy too interpreted as the b coefficients in OLS 
regression. But not to make the interpretation of the b coefficients too 
complicated, all the reader needs to be concerned with is if the b 
coefficients have a positive or a negative value. A more detailed re-
view of how the b coefficients should be interpreted will be present-
ed in the following Results chapter (Chapter 5).  
Construction of models  
To fully examine the relationship between the sex and the depend-
ents variables, four separate models are constructed.  
In Model 1 the relationship between sex and the dependent varia-
bles are examined. In other words, the bivariate relationship between 
sex and the dependent variables are examined in Model 1, which 
will enable to establish if it exists an association, and if it does, the 
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strengthen and direction of the association will thereafter be deter-
mined. In Model 2 the relationship between sex, the dependent vari-
ables and the control variables are examined. Hence, if an association 
is found in Model 1, the association will, in Model 2, be controlled 
for spurious correlation, and it will also be specified under which 
conditions the original bivariate relationship holds.  
Further, the control variables nationality and EP party group can 
both have a direct effect on the dependent variables, which is con-
trolled for in Model 2, and a simultaneous effect depending whether 
a MEP is a woman or a man. That is, the effect of the control varia-
bles might differ depending on the value of the independent varia-
ble. For example, being a woman from a certain member state or 
being a woman from a certain EP party group might higher or lower 
the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in a certain group. 
Hence, the control variables might interact with the independent 
variable, and these variables are known as interaction variables.  
In Model 3, the relationship between sex, nationality and the in-
teraction variables of these on the depended variables are examined. 
Hence, it is examined if being a woman from a certain member state 
higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in a 
certain group. In Model 4, the relationship between sex, EP party 
group and the interaction variables of these on the depended varia-
bles are examined. Here, it will instead be examined if being a wom-
an from a certain EP party group higher or lower the likelihood to be 
assigned to an EP committee in a certain group. 
Model 3 and Model 4 are thus not constructed on the basis of test-
ing Hypothesis 2a, Hypothesis 2b, Hypothesis 2c and Hypothesis 2d, 
since they are not derived from the feminist theories of legislative 
organization. As shown in Chapter 3, the feminist theories of legisla-
tive organization are developed on the national level, which means 
that they do not include nationality or EP party groups as prominent 
factors affecting committee assignments. However, previous studies 
on women´s descriptive representation have shown that political 
parties are important factors when explaining the number of women 
parliamentarians, as parties on the left tend to send more women to 
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Parliament. Hence, it is therefore interesting to examine if the impact 
of sex on the dependent variables differ depending on which EP 
party group an MEP is member in. Further, other factors which also 
have been outlined as prominent on the number of women elected to 
Parliament are the electoral system, economic development, secular-
ization and the level of gender-equality in a nation, and it is there-
fore interesting to examine if the effect of sex on the dependent vari-
ables differ depending on which member state an MEP are from. 
Model 3 and Model 4 are thus constructed on the basis to see if there 
might be any interesting inductive findings in the data, which can be 
used to further develop the feminist theories of organization to the 
supranational level.  
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5 Results 
In this chapter the results of the statistical tests are presented and 
analyzed. In the first part of the chapter, the results from the cross 
tabulations are reported and it is made clear whether the different 
hypotheses in the 1st set of Hypotheses are accepted or rejected. 
Thereafter, in the second part, the results from the logistic regres-
sions are reported and it is made clear whether the different hypoth-
eses in the 2nd set of Hypotheses are accepted or rejected.   
5.1 Where are the women? 
In Table 3 the cross tabulations of sex and the dependent variables 
are presented. Table 3 displays the percentage of women within each 
of the Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Econom-
ic/Technic groups, and a measure that compare the percentage of 
women within each group, with the average percentage of women in 
all the EP committees (comparison measure). A plus sign means an 
overrepresentation of women and a minus sign means an un-
derrepresentation of women. 
The results of the cross tabulations displayed in Table 3 show that 
the composition of women and men varies in the different groups. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, women have been more overrepre-
sented in EP committees in the Social welfare group than in EP 
committees in the Culture/Law group. Hence, women have been 
overrepresented with 12 percentage points as lowest (in the 1st EP) 
and 24 percentage points as highest (in the 3rd EP) in the Social wel-
fare group, whilst women been overrepresented with 4 percentage 
points as highest (in the 4th and 6th EP) in the Culture/Law group. 
The findings thus confirm previous observations of Wängnerud 
(1999) of a more significant overrepresentation of women parliamen-
tarians in committees in the Social welfare group than in the Cul-
ture/Law group.  
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Table 3 Cross tabulations of sex and membership in an EP 
Committee in a named group 
 Social  
welfare 
Culture 
/Law 
Basic  
functions 
Economic/ 
Technic 
Average 
EP % Cf. % Cf. % Cf. % Cf. % 
1st (1979-1984) 29 +12 12 -5 13 -4 13 -4 17 
2nd (1984-1989) 38 +21 15 -2 9 -8 11 -6 17 
3nd (1989-1994) 46 +24 20 -2 12 -10 16 -6 22 
4th (1994-1999) 42 +16 30 +4 18 -8 25 -1 26 
5th (1999-2004) 50 +22 29 +1 20 -8 25 -3 28 
6th (2004-2009) 46 +16 34 +4 22 -8 28 -2 30 
7th (2009- ) 49 +14 37 +2 27 -8 31 -4 35 
Note: The comparison measure compare the average percentage of women in respec-
tive group with the average percentage of women in all the EP committees. (+)-signs 
means that women been overrepresented in relation to the average percentage, (-)-
signs means that women been underrepresented in relation to the average percentage. 
Sources: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009).  
A somewhat unexpected finding is, however, that women in the 
1st, 2nd and 3rd EP were not overrepresented but underrepresented in 
the Culture/Law group. In the first three EPs, the results in Table 3 
show a pattern of an underrepresentation of women in the Cul-
ture/Law group. Although, in the 4th EP, the pattern was inversely, 
and since then, there is instead a pattern of an overrepresentation of 
women in the Culture/Law group. This finding is, to some extent, 
divergent to the observations of Wängnerud (1999) of a clear pattern 
of an overrepresentation of women parliamentarians in committees 
in the Culture/Law group.  
Leaving Hypothesis 1a and instead turning our attention to Hy-
pothesis 1b. The results in Table 3 show that women have been more 
underrepresented in EP committees in the Basic functions group 
than in EP committees in the Economic/Technic group, thus contra-
dicting Hypothesis 1b. In the 1st EP, women were underrepresented 
with the same percentage points (4 percentage points) in the Basic 
functions group and in the Economic/Technic group. But since the 
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2nd EP, women have been more underrepresented in the Basic func-
tions group than in the Economic/Technic group. Hence, women 
have been underrepresented with 8 percentage points as lowest (in 
the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th EP) and 10 percentage points as highest (in 
the 3rd EP) in the Basic functions group. In the Economic/Technic 
group, women have been underrepresented with 7 percentage points 
as highest (in the 2nd EP). Hence, the results in Table 3 show that 
there is a pattern of an underrepresentation of women in both the 
Economic/Technic group and in the Basic functions group in all EPs. 
Although the underrepresentation of women has been greatest in the 
Basic functions group, except in the 1st EP. This finding is thus diver-
gent to Wängnerud´s (1999) observation that women parliamentari-
ans are more underrepresented in committees in the Econom-
ic/Technic group than in the Basic functions group.  
However, one methodological problem that the coding of the de-
pended variables induces in the above results is that a MEP only can 
be counted once in the different groups. Thus, in the results in Table 
3, it has not been taken into consideration that a MEP can occupy 
more than one seat in EP committees in a named group, and as a 
result, the results in Table 3 do not display the actual percentage of 
seats occupied by women within each of the Social welfare, Cul-
ture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic groups, or the 
actual average percentage of seats occupied by women in all EP 
committees. The results in Table 3 have therefore been controlled for 
the actual number of seats occupied by women in the different 
groups. Table 4 displays the percentage of seats occupied by women 
within each of the Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and 
Economic/Technic groups, and a measure that compare the percent-
age of seats occupied by women within each group with the average 
percentage of seats occupied by women in all EP committees (com-
parison measure). A plus sign means an overrepresentation of wom-
en and a minus sign means an underrepresentation of women.  
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Table 4 Cross tabulations of sex and number of seats in an EP 
committee in a named group 
 Social  
welfare 
Culture 
/Law 
Basic  
functions 
Economic/ 
Technic 
Average 
EP % Cf. % Cf. % Cf. % Cf. % 
1st (1979-1984) 29 +12 11 -6 13 -4 13 -4 17 
2nd (1984-1989) 45 +28 17 0 9 -8 10 -7 17 
3nd (1989-1994) 49 +27 18 -4 12 -10 17 -5 22 
4th (1994-1999) 44 +18 29 +3 18 -8 25 -1 26 
5th (1999-2004) 51 +23 28 0 20 -8 25 -3 28 
6th (2004-2009) 48 +18 34 +4 22 -8 27 -3 30 
 7th (2009- ) 51 +16 39 +4 27 -8 30 -5 35 
Note: The comparison measure compare the average percentage of seats occupied by 
women in respective group with the average percentage of seats occupied women in 
all the EP committees.  (+)-signs means that women been overrepresented in relation 
to the average percentage, (-)-signs means that women been underrepresented in 
relation to the average percentage. Source: The official EP website and Yordanova 
(2009). 
The results in Table 4 more or less coincides the results displayed 
in Table 3.15 One thing worth noting though is that the composition 
of women and men in the Culture/Law group is even more less sex 
characterized in Table 4. Hence, the results in Table 4 show no pat-
tern of an underrepresentation or an overrepresentation of women. 
Again this finding is, to some extent, divergent to Wängnerud´s 
(1999) observation of a clear pattern and overrepresentation of wom-
en parliamentarians in committees in the Culture/Law group.  
                                                          
15 Since the number seats in the EP committees vary between the different EPs and 
hence even greater within the same EP (see Chapter 3). The results displayed in Table 
4 have been controlled for the number of seats in the different groups, by an examina-
tion of the difference between the observed and the expected number of seats per 
woman MEP based on the average percentage of seats occupied by women MEPs in 
all the EP committees. The results from the examination coincided with the results 
displayed in table 4 (See appendix 5). 
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5.1.1 Summary 
The main result of the analysis is that: women have been more 
overrepresented in EP committees in the Social welfare group than 
in EP committees in the Culture/Law group, in all EPs; and that 
women have been more underrepresented in EP committees in the 
Basic functions group than in EP committees in the Econom-
ic/Technic group, in all EPs except for the 1st EP. The finding thus 
implies that Hypothesis 1a is accepted and that Hypothesis 1b is 
rejected. A summary of the 1st set of Hypotheses is displayed in Ta-
ble 5. 
The two groups that thus appear to be most sex characterized are 
the Social welfare group and the Basic functions group, which is, to 
some extent, divergent from Wängnerud´s (1999) observation that 
women are most overrepresented in committees in the Social welfare 
group and most underrepresented in committees in the Econom-
ic/Technic group. But before a deeper discussion regarding which 
conclusions that can be drawn from these findings, Hypothesis 2a, 
Hypothesis 2b, Hypothesis 2c, and Hypothesis 2d will be tested and 
the results from the logistic regressions will be presented and ana-
lyzed. 
 
Table 5 Summary of the 1st set of Hypotheses 
  
Hypotheses Decision 
H1a: Women MEPs are more overrepresented in EP committees in the Social 
welfare group than in EP committees in the Culture/Law group.  
Accepted 
H1b: Women MEPs are more underrepresented in EP committees in the 
Economic/Technic group than in EP committees in the Basic functions 
group. 
Rejected 
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5.2 Does sex matter? 
In the following section, the bivariate relationship between sex and 
membership in an EP committee in a named group is further exam-
ined. By running a series of logistic regressions, it is established if it 
exists an association between sex and the dependent variables, and if 
it does, the strength and the direction of the association is deter-
mined.  
For each of the four dependent variables, in each EP, four models 
are reported. (Revisit Chapter 4 for a thorough review of the varia-
bles and models). In Model 1, the relationship between sex and the 
dependent variables is reported. A positive value for a b coefficient 
signifies a positive effect for women on the probability of member-
ship in an EP committee in a named group, the opposite holds for a 
negative value. Further, since the b coefficients do not allow the sizes 
of these effects to be estimated, the predicted probabilities of mem-
bership in EP committees in a named group for women and men are 
reported in Table 13.  
In Model 2, the relationship between sex, the dependent variables 
and the control variables is reported. A positive value for the varia-
ble sex´s b coefficients signifies a positive effect for women on the 
probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, 
the opposite holds for a negative value. For the control variables´ b 
coefficients, positive values signify a positive effect on the probabil-
ity of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the oppo-
site holds for negative values. 
In Model 3, the relationship between sex, nationality and the in-
teraction variable of these on the dependent variables is reported. A 
positive value for the variable sex´s b coefficients signifies a positive 
effect for women MEPs from the United Kingdom on the probability 
of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the opposite 
holds for a negative value. However, it is not possible to foretell if 
the interaction variables´ b coefficients values signify a positive or a 
negative effect for women from respectively member state on the 
probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group by 
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alla utredningar ska pröva det offentliga åtagandet inom det område 
som är aktuellt och ange en lämplig nivå för detta. 
När utredaren diskuterade ansvarsfördelningen mellan stat 
och kommun resonerade man kring den statliga förvaltningspoliti-
ken i allmänhet, och angav att denna utgår från att ”beslut och verk-
samheter som rör medborgarna bör tas och utformas så nära dem 
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just observing them, they need to be recalculated first. How this is 
done will be made clear in the in the text. 
In Model 4 the relationship between sex, EP party group and the 
interaction variable of these on the dependent variables is reported. 
A positive value for the variable sex´s b coefficient signifies a posi-
tive effect for women MEPs from the Others EP party group on the 
probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, 
the opposite holds for negative values. However, likewise as above, 
it is not possible to foretell if the interaction variables´ b coefficients 
values signify a positive or a negative effect for women from respec-
tively EP party group on the probability of membership in an EP 
committee in a named group by just observing them, they need to be 
recalculated first. How this is done will be made clear in the text. 
The results from the logistic regressions in the different EPs are 
reported and analyzed separately, starting with the 1st EP and end 
with the current 7th EP. In the last part of this section, the summary 
section, the main results of the analysis of the logistic regressions in 
all EPs are presented and it is made clear whether the different hy-
potheses are accepted or rejected. However, it is now time to turn to 
the results of the logistic regressions in the 1st EP.  
5.2.1 The probability of membership in an EP commit-
tee in a named group in the 1st EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 1st EP are displayed in 
Table 6. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on mem-
bership in an EP committee in a named group only is significant in 
the Social welfare group. In the other groups, the effect of sex is not 
significant.  
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (b=.96), which implies a positive effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group. Hence, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
34.8%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
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an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 17.0%. That women 
are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (34.8%>17.0%) are well in line with other re-
searchers´ observations of committee assignments in national Par-
liaments (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; 
Wängnerud 1999). However, as mentioned above, sex does not have 
a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Eco-
nomic/Technic group. Comparing the results in Table 6 with the 
results in Table 3 and Table 4, this finding is not very surprisingly. 
Although, it is divergent to other researchers´ observations that 
women parliamentarians are significantly less likely than men par-
liamentarians, to be members in committees concerned with busi-
ness and private economic policies (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; 
Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). Further, in line with the expected 
result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP commit-
tee in the Culture/Law group or in the Basic functions group.  
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on member-
ship in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is unaffected 
(b=.96), when controlling for nationality and EP party group. More-
over, the results in Model 2 also show that neither nationality nor EP 
party group has an effect on membership in an EP committee in any 
of the groups in the 1st EP, which is consistent with previous re-
searchers´ observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; 
Yordanova 2009). 
So far, the results from Model 1 and Model 2 have been analyzed. 
The main result of the analysis is that: sex only is a statistical signifi-
cant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social 
welfare group, and that women have a higher likelihood to be as-
signed to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men in 
the 1st EP. Additionally, sex does not have a significant effect on 
membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group, in the 
Basic functions group or in the Economic Technic group, in the 1st 
EP. Thus, we have now come a long way in the analysis process of 
the results in Table 6, but still, the results in Model 3 and Model 4 
Where did all the women go?
46
 
46 
 
have not yet been analyzed. Therefore, we now turn to Model 3 and 
Model 4, to see if any of the interaction variables are significant.  
The results form Model 3 and Model 4 show that none of the in-
teraction variables are significant. The results thus implies that being 
a woman from a certain member state, or being a woman from cer-
tain EP party group does not higher or lower the likelihood to be 
assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 1st EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the 
analysis process of the results in Table 6 is finished, and we therefore 
turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 2nd EP. 
5.2.2 The probability of membership in an EP commit-
tee in a named group in the 2nd EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 2nd EP are displayed in 
Table 7. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on mem-
bership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the 
Social welfare group, in the Basic functions group and in the Eco-
nomic/Technic group. In the Culture/Law group, the effect of sex is 
not significant.  
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (b=1.77), which implies a positive effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
58.5%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 19.4%. Hence, women 
are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (58.5%>19.4%). Again, the result is in line with 
previous observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 
1994; Wängnerud 1999). An interesting remark is though, that the 
probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare 
group is higher for both women (34.8%<58.5%) and men 
(17.0%<19.4%) in the 2nd EP, than in the 1st EP. Although, the overall 
effect of sex is greater in the 2nd EP than in the 1st EP (b=1.77>b=0.96). 
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The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group is (b=-.89), which implies a negative effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
18.3%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 35.4%. That women 
are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group (18.3%<35.4%) is divergent to the expected 
result, but when comparing the results in Table 7 with the results in 
Table 3 and Table 4, this result is not all to surprisingly.  
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Economic/Technic group is (b=-.68), which implies a negative effect 
for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in 
the Economic/Technic group. Thus, the predicted probability that a 
woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Econom-
ic/Technic group is 20.7%, whilst the predicted probability that a 
man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic 
group is 34.1%. That women are less likely than men to be assigned 
to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic are in line with other 
researchers´ observations of committee assignments in national Par-
liaments (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; 
Wängnerud 1999) which hold that women parliamentarians are sig-
nificantly less likely than men parliamentarians, to be members in 
committees concerned with business and private economic policies 
(Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). 
However, an interesting remark is though that the main effect of sex 
is greater in the Basic functions group than in the Economic/Technic 
group (b=-.89<b=-.68). Further, in line with the expected result, sex 
does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on member-
ship in an EP committee in the Social welfare group, in the Basic 
functions group and in the Economic Technic group remains signifi-
cant and that there are no changes in the b coefficients´ directions, 
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when controlling for nationality and EP party group. An interesting 
observation in the results in Model 2 is though that the main effect of 
Greece on membership in an EP committee in the Basic function 
group is significant (b=1.14). Thus, the result implies that MEPs from 
Greece have a higher likelihood than MEPs from the United King-
dom to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group. 
In the other groups, neither nationality nor EP party group has any 
effect. Hence, it is difficult to draw any interesting remarks of the 
finding and an additional factor which enhances it is that although 
the EP were enlarged with two member states in the 2nd EP (10 
member states in the 1st EP and 12 member states in the 2nd EP), both 
Greece and the United Kingdom were members in the EU in the 1st 
EP. Thus, further analysis of the results in the following EPs will 
expose if this finding is relevant or not. However, since only the 
main effect of Greece is significant16, the results in Model 2 implies 
that neither nationality nor EP party group has an effect on member-
ship in an EP committee in any of the groups in the 2nd EP, which is 
consistent with previous researchers´ observations (cf. Bowler and 
Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009). 
In summary, the main result of the analysis of the results in Mod-
el 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of 
membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group, in the 
Basic functions group and in the Economic/Technic group; and that 
women have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee 
in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood than 
men, to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group 
and in the Economic/Technic group in the 2nd EP. Additionally, sex 
does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee 
in the Culture/Law group in the 2nd EP. 
However, before we turn to the 3rd EP, the results from Model 3 
and Model 4 needs to be analyzed. The results from Model 3 and 
Model 4 show, as in the 1st EP, that none of the interaction variables 
are significant. Thus, being a woman from a certain member state, or 
                                                          
16 The only control variable which is significant. 
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being a woman from certain EP party group, does not higher or low-
er the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the 
groups, in the 2nd EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the 
analysis process of the results in Table 7 is finished, and we therefore 
turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 3rd EP. 
5.2.3 The probability of membership in an EP commit-
tee in a named group in the 3rd EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 3rd EP are displayed in 
Table 8. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on mem-
bership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the 
Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Cul-
ture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of 
sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (b=1.82), which implies a positive effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
60.2%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 19.7%. Hence, women 
are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (60.2%>19.7%), and again, the finding is in line 
with previous researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 
1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). Further, the probability of 
membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is high-
er for both women (58.5%<60.2%) and men (19.4%<19.7) in the 3rd 
EP, than in the 2nd EP. Although, the overall effect of sex is greater in 
the 3rd EP than in the 2nd and 1st EP (b=1.82> b=1.77>b=0.96). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group is (b=-.92), which implies a negative effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
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will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic function group is 
18.5%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 36.3%. Hence, wom-
en are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group (18.5%<36.3). Again, this finding is divergent 
from the expected result. An interesting remark is though that the 
probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions 
group is higher in the 3rd EP than in the 2nd EP, for both women 
(18.3%<18.5%) and men (35.4%<36.3%), and the overall effect of sex 
is also greater in the 3rd EP than in the 2nd EP (b=-.92<b=-.89).  
Further, in contrast to the finding in the 2nd EP but consistent with 
the finding the 1st EP, sex do not have a significant effect on mem-
bership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. Hence, 
as mentioned before, this finding is divergent to other researchers´ 
observations that women parliamentarians are significantly less like-
ly than men parliamentarians, to be members in committees dealing 
with business and private economic concerns (Skard and Haavio-
Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). Moreover, in line 
with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership 
in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on member-
ship in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic 
functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in 
the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP 
Party group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationali-
ty nor EP party group has an effect on membership in an EP commit-
tee in any of the groups in the 3rd EP, which is consistent with previ-
ous researchers´ observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 
2006; Yordanova 2009).  
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Mod-
el 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership 
in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic func-
tions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned 
to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a low-
er likelihood than men, to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
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Basic functions group, in the 3rd EP. Additional, sex does not have a 
significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Cul-
ture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group in the 3rd EP. 
We now leave the results in Model 1 and Model 2 and instead 
turn our attention to the results in Model 3 and Model 4.  The results 
in Model 3 and Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables 
are significant. Hence, as in the 1st and 2nd EP, being a woman from a 
certain member state, or being a woman from certain EP party 
group, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an 
EP committee in any of the groups in the 3rd EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the 
analysis process of the results in Table 8 is finished, and we therefore 
turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 4th EP. 
5.2.4 The probability of membership in an EP commit-
tee in a named group in the 4th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 4th EP are displayed in 
Table 9. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on mem-
bership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the 
Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Cul-
ture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of 
sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (b=1.01), which implies a positive effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a women 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
40.9%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 20.2%. Hence, women 
are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (40.9%>20.2%). Again, the finding is in line 
with previous researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 
1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). An interesting remark is 
though that the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
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Social welfare group is lower for women (60.2%>40.9%) but higher 
men (19.7%<20.2%) in the 4th EP, than in the 3rd EP, and that the 
overall effect of sex is also smaller in the 4th EP than in the 3rd EP 
(b=1.01<b=1.82). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group is (b=-.65), which implies a negative effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
23.9%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 37.5%. Hence, wom-
en are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group (23.9%<37.4%). Again, this finding is diver-
gent from the expected result. Further, the probability of member-
ship in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is higher for 
both women (18.5%<23.9%) and men (36.3%<37.5%) in the 4th EP, 
than in the 3rd EP. Although, the overall effect of sex is lower in the 
4th EP than in the 3rd EP (b=-.65>b=-.92). Additionally, in line with 
the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an 
EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1st and 
the 3rd EP, and divergent to other researchers´ observations (cf. Skard 
and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does 
not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in 
the Economic/Technic group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on member-
ship in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic 
functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in 
the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP 
party group. An interesting observation in the results in Model 2 is 
though that the main effect of Conservatives on membership in an 
EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is significant (b=.59). 
Thus, the result implies that MEPs from the Conservative EP party 
group have a higher likelihood than MEPs from the Others EP party 
group to be assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic 
group. In the other groups, neither nationality nor EP party group 
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has any effect. Hence, it is difficult to draw any interesting remarks 
of the finding and an additional factor which enhances it is that the 
classification of the control variable EP party group induces that the 
Others EP party group consists of MEPs from the smaller EP party 
groups and the non-attached members in the 4th EP. Thus further 
analysis of the results in the following EPs will expose if this finding 
is relevant or not. However, since only the main effect of Conserva-
tives is significant17, the results in Model 2 implies that neither na-
tionality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP 
committee in any of the groups in the 2nd EP, which is consistent 
with previous researchers´ observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; 
McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009). 
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Mod-
el 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership 
in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic func-
tions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned 
to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a low-
er likelihood, than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group, in the 4th EP. Additional, sex does not have a 
significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Cul-
ture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group in the 4th EP. 
We now have come a long way in the analysis process of the re-
sults in Table 9, but before we turn to the 5th EP, the results from 
Model 3 and Model 4 needs to be analyzed. The results in Model 3 
and Model 4 show that one interaction variable is significant in 
Model 3, more precisely, the results show that the interaction varia-
ble for sex*Belgium on membership in an EP committee in the Basic 
functions group is significant. 
The interaction variable for sex*Belgium on membership in an EP 
committee in the Culture/Law group is (b=-2.78). To be able to see 
the size of the effect we simply add the main effect of sex (b=.47) 
with the interaction term (b=-2.78) and get the value -2.3118, which 
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18 .47+-2.78 = -2.31 
Maja Rhodin Edlund
53
 
52 
 
Social welfare group is lower for women (60.2%>40.9%) but higher 
men (19.7%<20.2%) in the 4th EP, than in the 3rd EP, and that the 
overall effect of sex is also smaller in the 4th EP than in the 3rd EP 
(b=1.01<b=1.82). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group is (b=-.65), which implies a negative effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
23.9%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 37.5%. Hence, wom-
en are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group (23.9%<37.4%). Again, this finding is diver-
gent from the expected result. Further, the probability of member-
ship in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is higher for 
both women (18.5%<23.9%) and men (36.3%<37.5%) in the 4th EP, 
than in the 3rd EP. Although, the overall effect of sex is lower in the 
4th EP than in the 3rd EP (b=-.65>b=-.92). Additionally, in line with 
the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an 
EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1st and 
the 3rd EP, and divergent to other researchers´ observations (cf. Skard 
and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does 
not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in 
the Economic/Technic group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on member-
ship in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic 
functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in 
the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP 
party group. An interesting observation in the results in Model 2 is 
though that the main effect of Conservatives on membership in an 
EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is significant (b=.59). 
Thus, the result implies that MEPs from the Conservative EP party 
group have a higher likelihood than MEPs from the Others EP party 
group to be assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic 
group. In the other groups, neither nationality nor EP party group 
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has any effect. Hence, it is difficult to draw any interesting remarks 
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Model 3, more precisely, the results show that the interaction varia-
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we EXP(-2.31) and get the value 0.1, which mean that a woman from 
Belgium are 0.1 times less likely to be assigned to an EP committee in 
the Culture/Law group than a man from Belgium. Hence, women 
from Belgium have thus a lower likelihood to be assigned to an EP 
committee in the Culture/Law, than men from Belgium. Putting it at 
another way, being a woman from Belgium compared to being from 
any other member state, lower the likelihood of being assigned to an 
EP committee in the Culture/Law group in the 4th EP. However, 
since no other interaction variables or neither the main effect of sex 
are significant, it is hard to draw any interesting remarks of this find-
ing, thus further analysis of the results in the following EPs are 
therefore needed to be able to determine if this finding is relevant or 
not. 
Further, the results in Model 4 show that none of the interaction 
variables are significant. Hence, the results implies, as in the 1st, 2nd 
and 3rd EP, that being a woman from a certain EP party group, does 
not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee 
in any of the groups in the 4th EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the 
analysis process of the results in Table 9 is finished, and we therefore 
turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 5th EP. 
5.2.5 The probability of membership in an EP commit-
tee in a named group in the 5th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 5th EP are displayed in 
Table 10. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on mem-
bership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the 
Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Cul-
ture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of 
sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (b=1.35), which implies a positive effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
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we EXP(-2.31) and get the value 0.1, which mean that a woman from 
Belgium are 0.1 times less likely to be assigned to an EP committee in 
the Culture/Law group than a man from Belgium. Hence, women 
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another way, being a woman from Belgium compared to being from 
any other member state, lower the likelihood of being assigned to an 
EP committee in the Culture/Law group in the 4th EP. However, 
since no other interaction variables or neither the main effect of sex 
are significant, it is hard to draw any interesting remarks of this find-
ing, thus further analysis of the results in the following EPs are 
therefore needed to be able to determine if this finding is relevant or 
not. 
Further, the results in Model 4 show that none of the interaction 
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and 3rd EP, that being a woman from a certain EP party group, does 
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With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the 
analysis process of the results in Table 9 is finished, and we therefore 
turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 5th EP. 
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tee in a named group in the 5th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 5th EP are displayed in 
Table 10. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on mem-
bership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the 
Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Cul-
ture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of 
sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (b=1.35), which implies a positive effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
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will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
46.3%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 18.4%. Hence, women 
are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (46.3%>18.4%). Again, the result is in line with 
previous researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; 
Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). An interesting remark is though 
that the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social 
welfare, group is higher for women (40.9%<46.3%) but lower men 
(20.2%>18.4%) in the 5th EP, than in the 4th EP . Further, the overall 
effect of sex is also greater in the 5th EP than in the 4th EP 
(b=1.35>b=1.01). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group is (b=-.61), which implies a negative effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
20.6%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 32.4%. Hence, wom-
en are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group (20.6%<32.4%). Again, this finding is diver-
gent from the expected result. Additionally, the probability of mem-
bership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is lower for 
both women (23.9%>20.6%) and men (37.5%>32.4) in the 5th EP, than 
in the 4th EP, and the overall effect of sex is also lower in the 5th EP 
than in the 4th EP (b=-.61>b=-.65). 
Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an 
effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. 
However, as in the 1st, 3rd and 4th EP, and divergent to other re-
searchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 
1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on 
membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group.  
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on member-
ship in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic 
functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in 
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the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP 
party group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationali-
ty nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP com-
mittee in any of the groups, which is consistent with previous obser-
vations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009).  
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Mod-
el 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership 
in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic func-
tions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned 
to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a low-
er likelihood than men, to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group in the 5th EP. Additionally, sex does not have a 
significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Cul-
ture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group, in the 5th EP.  
Turning our attention instead to the results in Model 3 and Model 
4, the results in Model 3 and Model 4 show that the main effect of sex 
and one of the interaction variables is significant in Model 3, more 
precisely, the results show that the main effect of sex and the interac-
tion variable for sex*Portugal on membership in an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group is significant.  
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (1.18). To be able to see the size of the effect 
we simply EXP(1.18) and get the value 3.25, which mean that a 
woman from the United Kingdom are 3.25 times more likely to be 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than a man 
from the United kingdom. Hence, women from the United Kingdom 
have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group, than men from the United Kingdom.  
The interaction variable for sex*Portugal on membership in an EP 
committee in the Social welfare group is (b=3.45). To be able to see 
the size of the effect we do the same procedure as in the section 
above. Thus adding the main effect of sex (b=1.18) with the interac-
tion variable (b=3.45), which gives the value 4.6319, which we 
                                                          
19 1.18+3.45 = 4.63 
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the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP 
party group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationali-
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the Social welfare group is significant.  
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Social welfare group is (1.18). To be able to see the size of the effect 
we simply EXP(1.18) and get the value 3.25, which mean that a 
woman from the United Kingdom are 3.25 times more likely to be 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than a man 
from the United kingdom. Hence, women from the United Kingdom 
have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group, than men from the United Kingdom.  
The interaction variable for sex*Portugal on membership in an EP 
committee in the Social welfare group is (b=3.45). To be able to see 
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EXP(4.63), and get the value 102.51, which mean that a woman from 
Portugal are 102.51 times more likely to be assigned to an EP com-
mittee in the Social welfare group, than a man from Portugal. Hence, 
women from Portugal have thus a higher likelihood to be assigned 
to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men Portugal.  
Thus, the results implies that being a woman from the United 
Kingdom or from Portugal, compared to being from any other mem-
ber state, higher the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee 
in the Social welfare group in the 5th EP. Additionally, the results 
also show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group is greater for MEPs from Portugal than for 
MEPs from the United Kingdom (4.63>1.18). The results thus fur-
thermore implies that being a woman from Portugal compared to 
being a woman from The United Kingdom higher the likelihood 
even more of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare 
group in the 5th EP.  
However, since no other interaction variables are significant it is 
hard to draw any interesting remarks of this finding. An added diffi-
culty is that comparing this finding with the finding in Table 9, that 
being a woman from Belgium, compared to being from any other 
member state lowers the likelihood of being assigned to an EP com-
mittee in the Culture/Law group, does not seems to be fruitful. 
Thus, further analysis of the results in the following EPs are there-
fore needed in order to be able to determine if this finding in Table 
10 is relevant or not. 
Further, the results in Model 4 show that none of the interaction 
variables is significant. Hence, the results implies, as in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd 
and 4th EP, that being a woman from a certain EP party group, does 
not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee 
in any of the groups in the 5th EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the 
analysis process of the results in Table 10 is finished, and we there-
fore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 6th EP. 
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5.2.6 The probability of membership in an EP commit-
tee in a named group in the 6th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 6th EP are displayed in 
Table 11. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on mem-
bership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the 
Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Cul-
ture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of 
sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (b=.98), which implies a positive effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
43.6%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 22.6%. Hence, women 
are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (43.6%>22.6%). Again, the result is in line with 
previous researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; 
Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). The probability of membership in 
an EP committee in the Social welfare group is lower for women 
(46.3%>43.6%) but higher for men (18.4%<22.6%) in the 6th, than in 
the 5th EP. The overall effect of sex is also smaller in the 6th EP, than 
in the 5th EP (b=.98<b=1.35). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group is (b=-.63), which implies a negative effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
23.2%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Basic function group is 36.2%. Hence, women 
are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group (23.2%>36.2%). Again, this finding is diver-
gent from the expected result. Further, the probability of member-
ship in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is higher for 
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5.2.6 The probability of membership in an EP commit-
tee in a named group in the 6th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 6th EP are displayed in 
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women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
23.2%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Basic function group is 36.2%. Hence, women 
are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
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both women (20.6%<23.2) and men (32.4<36.2) in the 6th EP, than in 
the 5th EP. The overall effect of sex is also higher in the 6th EP than in 
the 5th EP (b=-.63<b=-.61). 
Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an 
effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. 
However, as in the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th EP, and divergent to other re-
searchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 
1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on 
membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on member-
ship in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic 
functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in 
the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP 
party group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationali-
ty nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP com-
mittee in any of the groups, which is consistent with previous re-
searchers´ observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; 
Yordanova 2009).  
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Mod-
el 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership 
in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic func-
tions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned 
to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a low-
er likelihood, than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group, in the 6th EP. Additionally, sex does not have 
a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Cul-
ture/Law group or in the Economic/Technic group in the 6th EP.  
We now leave the results in Model 1 and Model 2 and instead 
turn our attention to the results in Model 3 and Model 4. The results 
in Model 3 and Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables 
are significant. Hence the results implies, as in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd EP, 
that being a woman from a certain member state does not higher or 
lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the 
groups in the 6th EP. Further, the results also implies, as in the 1st, 2nd, 
3rd ,4th and the 5th EP, that being a woman from a certain EP party 
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group, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an 
EP committee in any of the groups in the 6th EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the 
analysis process of the results in Table 11 is finished, and we there-
fore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the current 7th EP. 
5.2.7 The probability of membership in an EP commit-
tee in a named group in the 7th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the current 7th EP are dis-
played in Table 12. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex 
on membership in an EP committee in a named group is significant 
in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the 
Culture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect 
of sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (b=.82), which implies a positive effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
38.0%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 21.9%. Hence, women 
are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (38.0%>21.9%). Again, the result is in line with 
previous researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; 
Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). The probability of membership in 
an EP committee in the Social welfare group is lower for both wom-
en (43.6%>38.0) and for men (22.6%>21.9%) in the 7th, than in the 6th 
EP. The overall effect of sex is also smaller in the 7th EP, than in both 
the 6th and the 5th EP (b.82<b=.98<b=1.35). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group is (b=-.51), which implies a negative effect for 
women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
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group, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an 
EP committee in any of the groups in the 6th EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the 
analysis process of the results in Table 11 is finished, and we there-
fore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the current 7th EP. 
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The results of the logistic regressions in the current 7th EP are dis-
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25.1%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 36.0%. Hence, wom-
en are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group (25.1%<36.0%). Again, this finding is diver-
gent from the expected result. Further, the probability of member-
ship in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is lower for 
women (23.2%>25.1%) but higher men (36.2%<36.0%) in the 7th EP, 
than in the 6th EP. The overall effect of sex is though lower in the 7th 
EP than in the 6th EP (b=-51>b=-.63). 
Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an 
effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. 
However, as in the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th EP, and divergent to other 
researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 
1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on 
membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on member-
ship in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic 
functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in 
the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP 
party group. The results in Model 2, also show that neither nationali-
ty nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP com-
mittee in any of the groups, which is consistent with previous obser-
vations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009). 
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Mod-
el 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership 
in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic func-
tions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned 
to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a low-
er likelihood, than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group, in the current 7th EP. Additionally, sex does 
not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in 
the Culture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group in the 
current 7th EP.  
Leaving the results in Model 1 and Model 2 and instead turning 
our attention to the results in Model 3 and Model 4. The results in 
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Model 4 show that the main effect of sex and one of the interaction 
variables is significant, more precisely, the results show that the 
main effect of sex and the interaction variable for sex*Liberals on 
membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is signif-
icant.  
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is (0.88). To be able to see the size of the effect 
we simply EXP(0.88) and get the value 2.41, which mean that a 
woman from the Others EP party group are 2.41 times more likely to 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than a 
man from the Others EP party group. Hence, women from the Oth-
ers EP party group have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP 
committee in the Social welfare group, than men from the Others EP 
party group.  
The interaction term for sex*Liberals on membership in an EP 
committee in the Social welfare group is (b=-1.37). To be able to see 
the size of the effect we do the same procedure as before. Thus add-
ing the main effect of sex (b=.88) with the interaction variable (b=-
1.37), which gives the value -0.4920, which we EXP(-0.49), and get the 
value 0.61, which mean that a woman from the Liberals EP party 
group are 0.61 times less likely to be assigned to an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group, than a man from the Liberals EP party 
group. Hence, women from the Liberals EP party group have a low-
er likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare 
group, than men from the Liberals EP party group. Thus, the results 
implies that being a woman from the Others EP Party group, com-
pared to being from another EP Party group, higher the likelihood of 
being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, while 
being a women from the Liberals EP party group, compared to being 
from any another EP Party groups, lower the likelihood of being 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group in the cur-
rent 7th EP. However, since no other interaction variables are signifi-
cant it is hard to draw any interesting remarks of this finding. An 
                                                          
20 .88+-1.37 = -0.49 
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added difficulty is, as mentioned before, that the classification of the 
control variable EP party group induces that the Others EP party 
group consists of MEPs from the smaller EP party groups and the 
non-attached members in the current 7th EP.  
5.2.8 Summary 
The result from the analysis shows that women have a higher likeli-
hood than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social wel-
fare group, in all EPs. This finding is well in line with other research-
ers´ observations of committee assignments in national Parliaments 
(Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999) 
and consistent with Hypothesis 2a, which implicates that Hypothesis 
2a is accepted. However, there are no evidence in the data of a pat-
tern that the effect of sex has been decreasing over time, which is 
contrary to the findings of Wängnerud (1999) who found that the 
effect of sex on committee assignments to the Social welfare group in 
the Swedish Parliament decreased over time, and that the effect of 
sex no longer was significant after the 1994 election.  
Further, the result from the analysis also shows, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2b, that sex does not have an effect on assignments to EP 
committees in the Culture/Law group in any of the EPs. The finding 
thus implicates that Hypothesis 2a is accepted.  
However, contrary to Hypothesis 2c, the result from the analysis 
shows that women have a lower likelihood than men to be assigned 
to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in all EPs, except 
for in the 1st EP. Hence, the finding implies that Hypothesis 2c is 
rejected. Additional, as in the Social welfare group, there is no evi-
dence in the data of a pattern that the effect of sex has been decreas-
ing over time.  
The result from the analysis furthermore shows, contrary to Hy-
pothesis 2d, that sex only had an effect on assignments to EP commit-
tees in the Economic group in the 2nd EP. In the other EPs, sex did not 
have an effect. Hence, the finding thus implies that Hypothesis 2d is 
rejected. Further, the finding is also divergent to other researchers´ 
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observations of committee assignments in national Parliaments (Skard 
and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). A sum-
mary of the 2nd set of Hypothesis is displayed in Table 14. 
 Additionally, except for minor expectations in the 2nd and 4th EP, 
the results from the analysis show that neither nationality nor EP par-
ty group has an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of 
the groups. These findings are thus consistent with previous research-
ers´ observations (Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 
2009) that the composition of the EP committees is largely proportion-
al to the national and partisan composition of the plenary. 
Moreover, the result shows that the control variable nationality 
interacted with sex in the 4th and 5th EP. In the 4th EP, being a woman 
from Belgium compared to being from any other member state de-
creased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group. While in the 5th EP, being a woman from the 
United Kingdom or from Portugal, compared to being from any 
other member state, increased the likelihood of being assigned to an 
EP committee in the Social welfare group. Further, the results also 
shows that being a woman from Portugal compared to being a 
woman from The United Kingdom increased the likelihood even 
more. It is difficulty to draw any interesting remarks of these induc-
tive findings since comparing the finding in the 4th EP with the find-
ing in the 5th EP does not seem to give any fruitful insights. Further, 
since no other interaction variables in the different EPs were signifi-
cant the result of the analysis thus implies that being a woman from 
a certain member state does not increase or decrease the likelihood to 
be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups.  
In the current 7th EP, the result showed that the control variable 
EP party group interacted with sex. Hence, being a woman from the 
Others EP Party group, compared to being from another EP Party 
group, increased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee 
in the Social welfare group, while being a women from the Liberals 
EP party group, compared to being from another EP Party group, 
decreased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group in the current 7th EP. However, as mentioned 
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before, the classification of the control variable EP party group in-
duces that the Others EP party group consists of MEPs from the 
smaller EP party groups and the non-attached members in the cur-
rent 7th EP. Thus, the result may be a product of a methodological 
choice in the classification process of the EP party groups. Further, 
since no other interaction variables in the different EPs were signifi-
cant, the result of the analysis implies that being a woman from a 
certain EP party group does not increase or decrease the likelihood 
to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups. 
 
Table 14 Summary of the 2nd set of Hypotheses 
  
 
Hypotheses Decision 
H2a: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social 
welfare group is increased by being a woman. 
Accepted 
H2b: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law 
group is neither increased nor decreased by being a woman. 
Accepted 
H2c: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Basic 
functions groups is neither decreased nor increased by being a woman. 
Rejected 
H2d: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Econom-
ic/Technic group is decreased by being a woman. 
Rejected 
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regleringar är exempel på begränsningar av kommunernas möjlighet 
att avstå från att använda marknadsstyrning och privata utförare.  
Ekonomiska styrmedel är inte direkt tvingande, men om 
styrmedlens incitament blir tillräckligt starka är det svårt för kom-
munerna att inte anpassa sig. Förordningen om statsbidrag till 
kommuner som tillämpar maxtaxa inom förskolan och fritidshem-
met (SFS 2001:160) reglerar ett frivilligt statsbidrag som ges till 
kommuner som tillämpar systemet med en högsta avgift inom de 
nämnda verksamheterna. Sedan den 1 januari 2003 tillämpar alla 
kommuner maxtaxa vilket indikerar att trots att systemet är frivillig 
så är statsbidraget ett erbjudande som det i praktiken är omöjligt att 
säga nej till.  
De ovan nämnda exemplen på statlig styrning brukar normalt 
inte inkluderas när man talar om specialregler för kommunal verk-
samhet. Termen specialreglerad verksamhet rör regler som faller 
under kommunallagen 2 kap. 4 § ”Om kommunernas och landsting-
ens befogenheter och skyldigheter på vissa områden finns det sär-
skilda föreskrifter.” Den specialreglerade verksamheten består i gro-
va drag av tre typer av regleringar: 1) reglering som tar sikte att göra 
vissa angelägenheter obligatoriska för kommuner och landsting, till 
exempel inom plan- och byggväsendet, skolområdet, socialtjänsten 
och hälso- och sjukvården. Dessa uppgifter brukar kallas kommunal 
kärnverksamhet. Därutöver finns specialregler som rör 2) myndig-
hetsutövning mot enskild, till exempel i ärenden om bistånd eller 
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6 Conclusions 
Examining the EP committee compositions and assignments in all 
direct elected EPs, this study shows that: women are more common-
ly found in EP committees concerned with social welfare policies, 
but less commonly found in EP committees concerned with the basic 
functions of the EU policies, and economic and technic policies; and 
that sex has an impact on individual MEPs assignments to EP com-
mittees concerned with social welfare policies and the basic func-
tions of the EU policies. 
However, to be able to fully conclude that sex has an impact on 
individual MEPs assignments, more data of MEPs´ profiles are need-
ed for further examinations under which conditions the associations 
holds. This implies a need for studies that explore the causal mecha-
nisms behind assignments, for example how MEPs preference, inter-
ests and expertise affect EP committee assignments (see Yordanova 
2009) as previously findings relying on qualitative interviews sug-
gest that “… most members are able to self-select their committee 
positions and many do so primarily on the basis of their own policy 
preferences…” (Whitaker 2001:82) Hence, it is conceivable that 
women have greater preferences, interests and expertise in social 
welfare policies, than men and therefore to a great extent choose to 
join EP committees that are concerned with that type of policies. 
Conversely, this pattern of thoughts also implies that women have 
lower preferences, interests and expertise in the basic functions of 
the EU policies and therefore to a great extent choose not to join EP 
committees that are concerned with that type of policies. However, 
on the other hand, it is also possible that women and men are ex-
cluded from certain areas in politics (Wängnerud 1999:49). If this is 
the case, if exclusions exist, it can be interesting for further studies to 
problematize which impact this might have on the type of polices the 
EU adopts, and what this might mean on the hopes that the EP will 
solve the EU´s “democratic deficit” problem. Nevertheless, the find-
ings of this study indicate that a division exists of how the power is 
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distributed between women and men in the EP. Although, it is not 
possible, from this study, to draw any conclusions on what this divi-
sion implicate. The finding of this study still goes in line with previ-
ous studies’ questioning of the effectiveness of EU´s actions for bal-
anced representation of women and men in the political decision-
making process.  
Further, this study´s finding also suggest that feminist theory of 
legislative organization can bring important insights into the study 
of women´s descriptive representation in the EP. Although the theo-
ry needs to be revised and further developed at the supranational 
level. Thus, the findings in this study show evidence in support for a 
gendered division between different policy areas in the EP. But the 
finding indicates that the two most gendered policy areas are social 
welfare and the basic functions of the EU, and not social welfare and 
economic and technic which the feminist theory suggests. Further-
more, the inductive finding in this study suggests that neither na-
tionality nor EP party group has an effect on women´s committee 
assignments. Consequently, the factors explaining why social wel-
fare and the basic functions of the EU are the most gendered and sex 
characterized policy areas in the EP needs to be found in other theo-
ries, than the feminist theory that has been presented in this study. 
One approach for further studies can be to examine the EP´s internal 
organization from an institutional perspective.  
Further studies can examine the effect of the development of the 
legislative powers of the EP on the composition and assignments of 
the EP committees. Whereas the legislative powers in the 1st and 2nd 
EP were limited to serving as a consultative body, with the introduc-
tion of the co-decision procedure in the 3rd EP (Maastricht Treaty, 
1992) the EP was given equal authority with the Council of Minis-
ters, and subsequently the EP has steadily increased its application 
to most policy areas (culminating in the Lisbon Treaty, 2009). In oth-
er words, further studies can examine if the effect of sex on commit-
tee assignments differ depending on how the legislative powers of 
the EP in different policy areas have developed. 
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Additionally, the effect of the differences in the EP committees’ 
power on the composition and assignments of the EP committees can 
also be addressed by future studies. Hence, the EP committees´ 
powers differ depending how much they can in influence the EU 
budget and legislation, and further studies can examine if the effect 
of sex on committee assignments differ depending how power full 
the EP committees are.   
Lastly, women´s representation in the EP is an important research 
area, and it is essential that further studies increases the knowledge 
in order to better understand how the power between women and 
men is distributed within the EP, and why a division exists. 
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Appendix 2 
Classification of the EP committees 
Table 1 show in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Cul-
ture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP 
committees in the 5th EP been placed in.  
Table 1 Classification of the EP committees in the 5th EP  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Employment and 
social affairs 
 Environment, 
public health and 
consumer policy 
 Women´s rights 
and equal oppor-
tunities 
 Citizen´s 
freedoms and 
rights, justice 
and home 
affairs 
 Constitutional 
affairs 
 Culture, youth, 
education, the 
media and 
sport 
 Legal affairs 
and the inter-
nal market 
 Petitions 
 Agriculture and 
rural development 
 Fisheries 
 Foreign Affairs 
 Regional policy, 
transport and tour-
ism 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
 Industry, external 
trade, research and 
energy 
Source: The official EP website 
  
Maja Rhodin Edlund
101
 
100 
 
Appendix 2 
Classification of the EP committees 
Table 1 show in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Cul-
ture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP 
committees in the 5th EP been placed in.  
Table 1 Classification of the EP committees in the 5th EP  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Employment and 
social affairs 
 Environment, 
public health and 
consumer policy 
 Women´s rights 
and equal oppor-
tunities 
 Citizen´s 
freedoms and 
rights, justice 
and home 
affairs 
 Constitutional 
affairs 
 Culture, youth, 
education, the 
media and 
sport 
 Legal affairs 
and the inter-
nal market 
 Petitions 
 Agriculture and 
rural development 
 Fisheries 
 Foreign Affairs 
 Regional policy, 
transport and tour-
ism 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
 Industry, external 
trade, research and 
energy 
Source: The official EP website 
  
 
101 
 
Table 2 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Cul-
ture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP 
committees in the 4th EP been placed in. 
Table 2 Classification of the EP committees in the 4th EP  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Environment, 
public health and 
consumer protec-
tion 
 Social affairs, 
employment and 
the working envi-
ronment 
 Women´s rights 
 Civil liberties 
and internal 
affairs 
 Culture, youth, 
education and 
the media 
 Institutional 
affairs  
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Petitions 
 Rules of proce-
dure, the verifi-
cation of cre-
dentials and 
immunities 
 Agriculture and 
rural development 
 Fisheries 
 Foreign Affairs 
 Regional policy, 
regional planning 
and relations with 
regional and local 
authorities 
 Transport and 
tourism 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
and industrial policy 
 Energy, research 
and technology 
 External economic 
relations 
Source: The official EP website. 
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Table 3 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Cul-
ture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP 
committees in the 3rd EP been placed in.  
Table 3 Classification of the EP committees in the 3rd EP  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Environment, 
public health and 
consumer protec-
tion 
 Social affairs, 
employment and 
the working envi-
ronment 
 Women´s rights 
 Civil liberties 
and internal 
affairs 
 Culture, youth, 
education and 
the media 
 Institutional 
affairs 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Petitions 
 Rules of proce-
dure, the verifi-
cation of cre-
dentials and 
immunities 
 Agriculture, 
fisheries and food 
 Foreign Affairs 
 Regional policy, 
regional planning 
and relations with 
regional and local 
authorities 
 Transport and 
tourism 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
and industrial policy 
 Energy, research 
and technology 
 External economic 
relations 
Source: The official EP website. 
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Table 4 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Cul-
ture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP 
committees in the 2nd EP been placed in.  
Table 4 Classification of the EP committees in the 2nd EP  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Environment, 
public health and 
consumer protec-
tion 
 Social affairs and 
employment 
 Women´s rights 
 Institutional affairs 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Petitions 
 Rules of proce-
dure, the verifica-
tion of credentials 
and immunities 
 Youth, culture, 
education, infor-
mation and sport 
 Agriculture, 
fisheries and 
food 
 Political Affairs 
 Regional policy 
and regional 
planning 
 Transport 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
and industrial policy 
 Energy, research 
and technology 
 External economic 
relations  
Source: The official EP website. 
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Table 5 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Cul-
ture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP 
committees in the 1st EP been placed in 
Table 5 Classification of the EP committees in the 1st EP 
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Environment, 
public health and 
consumer protec-
tion 
 Social affairs and 
employment 
 Institutional 
affairs 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Rules of proce-
dure and peti-
tions 
 Verification of 
credentials 
 Youth, culture, 
education, in-
formation and 
sport 
 Agriculture, 
fisheries and food 
 Political Affairs 
 Regional policy 
and regional 
planning 
 Transport 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
and industrial policy 
 Energy, research 
and technology 
 External economic 
relations 
Source: The official EP website. 
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Table 5 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Cul-
ture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP 
committees in the 1st EP been placed in 
Table 5 Classification of the EP committees in the 1st EP 
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Environment, 
public health and 
consumer protec-
tion 
 Social affairs and 
employment 
 Institutional 
affairs 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Rules of proce-
dure and peti-
tions 
 Verification of 
credentials 
 Youth, culture, 
education, in-
formation and 
sport 
 Agriculture, 
fisheries and food 
 Political Affairs 
 Regional policy 
and regional 
planning 
 Transport 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
and industrial policy 
 Energy, research 
and technology 
 External economic 
relations 
Source: The official EP website. 
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Appendix 4 
Codebook of the datasets  
VARIABLES CODING 
Dependent variables:  
Membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group 
Membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group 
Membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group 
Membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group 
 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
Independent variable: 
Sex 
 
1 = woman, 0 = man 
Control variable Nationality:  
Belgium 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Bulgaria 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Cyprus 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Czech Republic 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Denmark 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Estonia 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Finland 1 = yes, 0 = no 
France 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Germany 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Greece 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Hungary 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Ireland 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Italy 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Latvia 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Lithuania 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Luxembourg 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Malta 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Netherland 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Poland 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Portugal 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Romania 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Slovakia 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Slovenia 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Spain 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Sweden 1 = yes, 0 = no 
The United Kingdom 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Control variable EP Party group:  
Radical left 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Socialists 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Liberals 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Conservatives 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Others 1 = yes, 0 = no 
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Appendix 5 
Control of the number of seats in the different groups 
Table 1 displays the difference between the observed and the ex-
pected number of seats occupied by women based on the average 
percentage of seats occupied by women in all the EP committees. 
Table 1 Difference between the observed and the expected 
number of EP committee seats per woman based on 
the average percentage of women in all the EP com-
mittees (rounded to whole numbers) 
 Social  
welfare 
Culture  
/Law 
Basic  
functions 
Economic/ 
Technic 
EP Women Women Women Women 
1st (1979-1984) +11 -7 -5 -7 
2nd (1984-1989) +42 0 -12 -10 
3nd (1989-1994) +43 -7 -16 -7 
4th (1994-1999) +31 +5 -19 -3 
5th (1999-2004) +49 0 -21 -7 
6th (2004-2009) +40 +5 -21 -6 
7th (2009- ) +34 +6 -19 -10 
Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009). 
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